

The coming recovery

By the Analysis and Forecasting Department, under the direction of [Eric Heyer](#) and [Xavier Timbeau](#)

This text summarises the [OFCE 2015-2016 economic outlook for the euro zone and the rest of the world](#)

While up to now the euro zone had not been part of the global recovery, the conjunction of a number of favourable factors (the fall in oil prices and depreciation of the euro) will unleash a more sustained process of growth that is shared by all the EU countries. These developments are occurring at a time when the massive and synchronised fiscal austerity that had pushed the euro zone back into recession in 2011 is easing. The brakes on growth are gradually being lifted, with the result that in 2015 and 2016 GDP should rise by 1.6% and 2%, respectively, which will reduce unemployment by half a point per year. This time the euro zone will be on the road to recovery. However, with an unemployment rate of 10.5% at the end of 2016, the social situation will remain precarious and the threat of deflation is not going away.

The expected demand shock

After a period during the Great Recession of 2008-2009 when growth was boosted by expansionary fiscal policy, the euro zone countries quickly reversed their policy orientation and adopted a more restrictive one. While the United States also chose to reduce its budget deficit, austerity has had less effect there. First, the negative demand shock at the euro zone level was amplified by the synchronisation of the consolidation. Second, in a context of rising public debt, the lack of fiscal solidarity between the countries opened up a breach for speculative attacks, which pushed up first sovereign rates and then bank rates or the non-financial agents market. The euro zone plunged into a new recession in

2011, while globally the momentum for growth gathered pace in the other developed countries (chart). This episode of consolidation and financial pressure gradually came to an end. In July 2012, the ECB made a commitment to support the euro; fiscal austerity was eased in 2014; and the Member States agreed on a draft banking union, which was officially initiated in November 2014, with new powers on banking supervision entrusted to the ECB. All that was lacking in the euro zone then was a spark to ignite the engine of growth. The transfer of purchasing power to households that resulted from the fall in oil prices – about one percentage point of GDP if oil prices stay down until October 2015 – represents this positive demand shock, which in addition has no budget implications. The only cost resulting from the shock comes from the decline in income in the oil-producing countries, which will lead them to import less in the coming quarters.

An external demand shock will combine with this internal demand shock in the euro zone. The announcement of a quantitative easing programme in the euro zone represents a second factor accelerating growth. This programme, under which the ECB is to purchase more than 1,000 billion euros of securities at a pace of 60 billion per month until September 2016, not only will amplify the fall in sovereign yields but more importantly will also lead to a reallocation of portfolio assets and drive the euro (further) down. Investors looking for higher returns will turn to dollar-denominated securities, especially as the prospect of a gradual monetary tightening in the US improves the outlook for earnings on this side of the pond. The rising dollar will lift the currencies of the Asian countries with it, which will increase the competitive advantage of the euro zone at the expense this time of the United States and some emerging countries. It is unlikely that the fragility induced in these countries and in the oil-producing countries by the oil shock and by the decline in the euro will offset the positive effects expected in the euro zone. On the contrary, they will also be vectors for the

rebalancing of growth needed by the euro zone.

Investment is the factor that will complete this growth scenario. The anticipation of higher demand will remove any remaining reluctance to launch investment projects in a situation where financing conditions are, overall, very positive, representing a real improvement in countries where credit constraints had weighed heavily on growth.

All this will lead to a virtuous circle of growth. All the signals should turn green: an improvement in household purchasing power due to the oil impact, increased competitiveness due to the lower euro, an acceleration in investment and, ultimately, growth and employment.

A fragile recovery?


While the elements promoting the euro zone's growth are not mere hypotheticals about the future but represent a number of tangible factors whose effects will gradually make themselves felt, the fact remains that they are somewhat fragile. The falling price of oil, for instance, is probably not sustainable. The equilibrium price of oil is closer to USD 100 than USD 50 and, ultimately, a rise in energy prices is in the cards: what has a positive effect today could undermine the resumption of a recovery tomorrow. The decline of the euro seems more long-term; it should last at least until the end of the ECB's quantitative easing programme, which officially is at least September 2016. The euro should not, however, fall below a level of 0.95 dollar per euro. The time it takes for changes in exchange rates to translate into trade volumes, however, should allow [the euro zone to benefit in 2016 from a gain in competitiveness](#).

It is worth noting that a Greek exit from the euro zone could also put a halt to the nascent recovery. The firewalls set up at the European level to reduce that risk should limit any contagion, at least so long as the political risk has not been

concretised. It will be difficult for the ECB to support a country where a party explicitly calling for leaving the euro zone is at the gates of power. The contagion that is now considered extinguished could then catch fire again and reignite the sovereign debt crisis in the euro zone.

Finally, the constraints of the Stability Pact have been shifted so as to leave more time to the Member States, particularly France, to get back to the 3% target. They have therefore not really been lifted and should soon be reinforced once it comes to assessing the budgetary efforts being made by the countries to reduce their debt.

Figure. The GDP of the euro zone, the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan



Source : National accounts, OFCE forecasts April 2015.

France: Recovery ... at last!

By [Mathieu Plane](#), [Bruno Ducoudré](#), [Pierre Madec](#), Hervé Péléraux and Raul Sampognaro

[The OFCE's forecast for the French economy in 2015-2016 is now available.](#)

Not since the beginning of the subprime crisis has the French economy been in such a favourable situation for a recovery. The fall in oil prices, the ECB's proactive and innovative policy, the easing of fiscal consolidation in France and the euro zone, the gathering impact of the CICE tax and the implementation of the Responsibility Pact (representing a tax transfer to business of 23 billion euros in 2015 and nearly 33 billion in 2016) all point in the same direction. The main obstacles that have held back French activity over the last four years (over-calibrated fiscal austerity, a strong euro, tight financial conditions, and high oil prices) should all be out of the way in 2015 and 2016, with pent-up growth finally released. The supply policy being pushed by the government, whose impact on business is still pending, will be all the more effective thanks to the positive demand shock from foreign trade, which will allow the economic rebalancing that was lacking up to now.

French GDP will grow by 1.4% in 2015, with the pace accelerating in the course of the year (to 2% yoy). The second half of 2015 will mark the turning point in the recovery, with the corporate investment rate picking up and the unemployment rate beginning to fall, ending the year at 9.8% (after 10% in late 2014). 2016 will then be the year of recovery, with GDP growth of 2.1%, a 4% increase in productive investment and the creation of nearly 200,000 private sector jobs, pushing the unemployment rate down to 9.5% by end 2016. In this positive context, the public deficit will fall significantly, and is expected to be 3.1% of GDP in 2016 (after 3.7% in 2015).

Obviously this virtuous cycle will only take effect if the macroeconomic environment remains favourable (low oil prices, a competitive euro, no new financial tensions in the euro zone, etc.) and if the government limits itself to the budget savings already announced.

Austerity and purchasing power in France

By [Mathieu Plane](#)

Is France implementing an austerity policy? How can it be measured? Although this question is a subject of ongoing public debate, it hasn't really been settled. For many observers, the relative resilience of wage dynamics indicates that France has not carried out an austerity policy, unlike [certain neighbours in southern Europe, in particular Spain and Greece, where nominal labour costs have fallen](#). Others conclude that France cannot have practiced austerity since government spending has continued to rise since the onset of the crisis[1]. The 50 billion euros in savings over the period 2015-17 announced by the Government would therefore only be the beginning of the turn to austerity.

Furthermore, if we adhere to the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, the degree of restriction or expansion of a fiscal policy can be measured by the change in the primary structural balance, which is also called the fiscal impulse. This includes on one side the efforts made on primary public spending (*i.e.* excluding interest) relative to the change in potential GDP, and on the other side the change in the tax burden in GDP points. Thus, over the period 2011-13, France's primary structural balance improved by 2.5 percentage points of GDP according to the OECD, by 2.7 points according to the European Commission, and by 3.5 points according to the OFCE. While there are significant differences in the measurement of fiscal austerity during this period, the fact remains that, depending on the method of calculation, it amounted to between 55 and 75 billion euros over three years[2].

A different way of measuring the extent of fiscal austerity involves looking at the change in the components of household purchasing power. Purchasing power can in fact be used to identify the channels for transmitting austerity, whether this is through labour income or capital, benefits or the tax burden on households[3]. Changes in the components of income clearly show that there was a pre-crisis and a post-crisis in terms of the dynamics of purchasing power per household.

Over the period 2000-2007, purchasing power grew by more than 4000 euros per household ...

This corresponds to an average increase of about 500 euros per year per household [4] (Table) over the eight years preceding the subprime crisis, a growth rate of 1.1% per year. On the resource side, real labour income per household (which includes the EBITDA of the self-employed), supported by the creation of more than 2 million full-time equivalent jobs over the period 2000 to 2007, increased on average by 0.9% per year. But it is above all real capital income per household (which includes the imputed rents of households occupying the accommodation that they own) that increased dramatically over this period, rising twice as fast (1.7% on average per year) as real labour income. As for social benefits in cash, these increased by 1% on average in real terms in this period, *i.e.* a rate equivalent to the rate for total resources. As for levies, tax and social contributions from 2000 to 2007 have helped to reduce purchasing power per household by 0.9 points per year, which corresponds to about 100 euros per year on average. Breaking down the increase in levies, 85% came from social contributions (employees and self-employed), mainly due to hikes in premiums related to pension reform. Taxes on income and wealth contributed to cutting purchasing power per household by only 14 euros per year, despite a sharp increase in capital income and property prices over the period 2000-2007. During this period, taxes on households deflated by consumer prices increased by less than 2%, whereas real

household resources grew by almost 9% and real capital income by 14%. The reduction in income tax, which began under the Jospin government, and was continued by Jacques Chirac during his second term, explains in large part why taxes have had so little negative impact on purchasing power during this period.

Changes in the components of purchasing power per household (in 2013 euros)

		Labour income (incl. EBITDA of IU)*	Capital income (incl. imputed rent**)	Social benefits in cash	Other resources	Total resources	Tax on income and wealth	Social contributions (salaried and non-salaried)	Total contributions	Purchasing power per household
Cumulative change	2000-2007	2283	1376	1120	34	4814	-110	-668	-778	4036
	2008-2015 o/w:	-1059	-911	1502	-61	-529	-785	-318	-1102	-1631
	2008-10	-293	-613	1021	-1	114	36	-36	0	114
	2011-13	-680	-314	355	-60	-699	-789	-143	-932	-1631
	2014-15	-85	16	125	0	56	-31	-139	-170	-114
Average annual change	2000-2007	285	172	140	4	602	-14	-83	-97	504
	2008-2015 o/w:	-151	-130	215	-9	-76	-112	-45	-157	-233
	2008-10	-98	-204	340	0	38	12	-12	0	38
	2011-13	-227	-105	118	-20	-233	-263	-48	-311	-544
	2014-15	-43	8	63	0	28	-16	-69	-85	-57

* IU = Individual undertakings.

** The notion of an imputed or fictive rent covers the service that is rendered to the owner of an accommodation by that accommodation, that is, the rent that owners would have to pay if they were tenants.

Sources: Insee national accounts, author's calculations, France's 2015 Budget Act.

..but over the period 2008-2015, purchasing power per household fell by more than 1600 euros

The crisis marks a sharp turn with respect to past trends. Indeed, over the period 2008-2015, purchasing power per household fell, on average, by almost 1630 euros, or 230 euros per year.

Over the eight years since the start of the crisis, we can distinguish three sub-periods:

– The first, from 2008 to 2010, following the subprime crisis and the collapse of Lehman Brothers, is characterized by the relatively high resistance of purchasing power per household, which increased by nearly 40 euros per year on average, despite the loss of 250,000 jobs over this period and the sharp decline in capital income (200 euros on average per year per household). On the one hand, the sharp drop in oil prices from mid-2008 had the effect of supporting

real income, including real wages, which increased 0.9% annually. On the other hand, the stimulus package and the shock absorbers of France's social security system played their countercyclical role by propping up average purchasing power through a sharp rise in social benefits in kind (340 euros on average per year household) and a slightly positive contribution by taxes to purchasing power.

– The second period, from 2011 to 2013, is marked by intense fiscal consolidation; this is a period in which [the tax burden increased by about 70 billion euros in three years,](#) with a massive impact on purchasing power. Higher tax and social security charges wound up eroding purchasing power by 930 euros per household, more than 300 euros on average per year. Moreover, the very small increase in employment (+32,000) and stagnating real wages, combined with the impact of an increase in the number of households (0.9% annually), led to a reduction in real labour income per household of almost 230 euros per year. In addition, real capital income per household continued to make a negative contribution to purchasing power from 2011 to 2013 (-105 euros on average per year per household). Finally, although social benefits were slowing compared to the previous period, they were the only factor making a positive contribution to purchasing power (about 120 euros per year per household). In the end, purchasing power per household fell by 1,630 euros in three years.


– The third period, 2014 and 2015, will see yet another slight reduction in household purchasing power, amounting to about 110 euros in two years. The weak situation of employment and real wages will not offset the increase in the number of households. Thus, real labour income per household will decline slightly over the two years (-43 euros per year on average). Real capital income will, in turn, be roughly neutral in terms of its effect on purchasing power per household. Although they are not rising as much, [tax and](#)

social contributions will continue to weigh on purchasing power due to the ramp-up of certain tax measures approved in the past (environmental taxes, higher pension contributions, local taxes, etc.). In total, the increase in the rate of levies on households in 2014-15 will reduce purchasing power per household by 170 euros. In addition, the expected savings on public spending will hold back growth in social benefits per household, which will rise by only about 60 euros per year on average, a rate that is half as high as the pre-crisis period despite the worsening social situation.

While this analysis does not tell us about the distribution per quantile of the change in purchasing power per household, it nevertheless provides a macro view of the impact of austerity on purchasing power since 2011. Out of the 1750 euros per household lost in purchasing power from 2011 to 2015 (see Figure), 1100 euros is directly related to higher taxes and social contributions. In addition to the direct impact of austerity, there is the more indirect impact on the other components of purchasing power. In fact, by cutting activity through the mechanism of the fiscal multiplier, France's austerity policy has had a massive impact on the labour market, by either reducing employment or holding down real wages. While the magnitude is difficult to assess, the fact remains that real labour income per household fell by 770 euros in five years. Finally, while since the onset of the crisis social benefits have up to now acted as a major shock absorber for purchasing power, the extent of savings in public spending planned from 2015 (out of the 21 billion euros in savings in 2015, 9.6 billion will come from social security and 2.4 billion from spending on state interventions) will have a mechanical impact on the dynamics of purchasing power.

Thus, with purchasing power per household falling in 2015 to its level of thirteen years ago and having suffered a historic decline in 2011-13 in a period of unprecedented fiscal consolidation, it seems difficult to argue on the one hand

that France has not practiced austerity so far and on the other hand that it is not facing any problem with short-term demand.



Sources: Insee national accounts, author's calculations, France's 2015 Budget Act.

[1] Since 2011, the rate of growth of public spending in volume has been positive, but has halved compared to the decade 2000-10 (1.1% in volume over the period 2011-14, against 2.2% over the period 2000-10). Moreover, in the last four years, it has increased at a rate slightly below the rate of potential GDP (1.4%). From an economic point of view, this corresponds to an improvement in the structural balance due to an adjustment in public spending of 0.5 percentage point of GDP over the period 2011-14.

[2] These differences in the measurement of austerity come from differences in a number of evaluation factors, such as the level of potential GDP and its growth rate, which serve as the benchmark for calculating the structural fiscal

adjustment.

[3] It is important to note that gross disposable income includes only income related to cash benefits (pensions, unemployment benefits, family allowances, etc.) but not social transfers in kind (health care, education, etc.) or public collective expenditures that benefit households (police, justice, defence, etc.).

[4] Here we use the concept of average purchasing power per household and not purchasing power per consumption unit.

Recovery aborted

By [Christophe Blot](#)

This text draws on the article "[Le piège de la déflation: perspectives 2014-2015 pour l'économie mondiale](#)" [The deflation trap: the 2014-2015 outlook for the world economy], written by Céline Antonin, Christophe Blot, Amel Falah, Sabine Le Bayon, Hervé Péléraux, Christine Riffart and Xavier Timbeau.

According to a [Eurostat press release](#) published on 14 November 2014, euro zone GDP grew by 0.2% in the third quarter of 2014, and inflation stabilized in October at the very low level of 0.4%. Although the prospects of a new recession have receded for now, the [IMF evaluates the likelihood of a recession](#) in the euro zone at between 35% and 40%. This dismal prospect reflects the absence of a recovery in the euro zone, which is preventing a rapid reduction in unemployment. What lessons can be drawn?

In the short term, this sluggishness is due to three factors

that have held back growth. First, fiscal consolidation, although less extensive than in 2013, has been continued in 2014 in a context where the multipliers remain high. Second, despite the reduction in long-term public interest rates due to the easing of pressure on sovereign debt, financing conditions for households and businesses in the euro zone have worsened, as the banks have not consistently passed on the reduction in long-term rates and lower inflation is leading to a tightening of real monetary conditions. Finally, the euro appreciated by more than 10% between July 2012 and early 2014. Even though the currency's rise reflects the winding down of pressure on euro zone bond markets, this has hurt exports. In addition to these short-term factors, recent data could herald the beginnings of a long phase of moderate growth and low inflation or even deflation in the euro zone.

Indeed, after a period of sharply increasing debt (see Figures), the financial situation of households and firms in the euro zone has deteriorated since 2008 due to a series of crises – financial, fiscal, banking and economic. This deterioration in the financial health of the non-financial sector has weakened its thirst for credit. Furthermore, households may be forced to cut down on their spending on consumption, and firms investment and their need for employment in order to reduce their debt. Adding to this is the fragility of certain banks, which need to absorb a high amount of bad debt; this is leading them to restrict the supply of credit, as is evidenced by the latest [SAFE survey](#) conducted by the ECB on SMEs. In a context like this where private agents prefer deleveraging, fiscal policy should play a crucial role. But this is not happening in the euro zone due to the desire to consolidate the trajectory of public finances at the expense of the goal of growth[1]. Furthermore, while many countries could get out of the excessive deficit procedure in 2015 [2], fiscal consolidation is expected to continue because of the rules in the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance

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
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(TSCG) requiring Member countries to make fiscal adjustments to bring public debt down to the 60% threshold within 20 years [3].


These conditions could push a recovery further down the road, and the euro zone could wind up locked in the trap of deflation. A lack of growth and high unemployment are creating downward pressure on prices and wages, pressure that is being exacerbated by internal devaluations, which are the only solutions being adopted to improve competitiveness and regain market share. This reduction in inflation is making the deleveraging process even more protracted and difficult, thus undercutting demand and strengthening the deflationary process. The Japanese experience of the 1990s shows that it is not easy to pull out of this kind of situation.

Figure 1. Debt of non-financial corporations



Source: Banque de France.

Figure 2. Household debt



Source: Banque de France.

[1] The costs of this strategy were evaluated in the two preceding iAGS reports ([see here](#)).

[2] France and Spain would, however, constitute two major exceptions, with budget deficits of, respectively, 4% and 4.2% in 2015.

[3] See the [post by Raul Sampognaro](#) for more on the specific case of Italy.


France: duty-free growth

By [Bruno Ducoudré](#) , [Éric Heyer](#), Hervé Péléraux, [Mathieu Plane](#)

[This post summarizes the 2014-2015 outlook for the French economy](#)

In early 2011, France was one of the few developed countries to have regained its pre-crisis level of GDP. Economic growth exceeded 2%, even reaching 3% yoy in the first quarter of 2011. Since then the situation has changed: the recovery was interrupted, and while the economy is experiencing positive growth, the rate is close to zero (Figure 1). Four types of shock explain why the post-recession recovery in 2011 died out. Growth was already being battered by austerity and by deteriorating credit conditions, and was then also hit by fluctuations in oil prices and by the impact of price competitiveness in 2012 as a result first of wage deflation in France's competitors and then in 2013 of the rise of the euro (Table 1).

Figure 1. Comparative development of GDP in France and in its main partners



Sources: National accounts.

In 2014, the improvement expected on the economic front did not occur: the stimulus due to the gradual easing of austerity is being offset by the powerful brake exerted by the significant appreciation of the euro that has taken place since mid-year as well as by the collapse in consumer investment in housing. As in the previous two years, growth is expected to come to 0.4%, which is not enough to reverse the rise in unemployment or to reduce the public deficit significantly. Worse, while the public deficit has been cut by over 3 GDP points since 2009, it is now expected to rise slightly once again, reaching 4.5% of GDP (Tables 1 and 2).

Table 1. The brakes on French growth (2013 – 2015)

In points of growth			
	2013	2014	2015
GDP growth	0,4	0,4	1,1
Impact on GDP of			
... changes in oil prices	-0.1	0.0	0.0
<i>Direct impact on the French economy</i>	-0.1	0.0	0.0
<i>Impact via addressed demand</i>	0.0	0.0	0.0
... price competitiveness	-0.1	-0.4	0.2
<i>Impact of change in euro exchange rate</i>	-0.1	-0.2	0.1
<i>Effect of Intra-euro zone competitiveness</i>	0.0	-0.2	0.1
... credit conditions	-0.1	-0.2	-0,1
<i>Direct impact on the French economy</i>	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1
<i>Impact via addressed demand</i>	0.0	-0.1	0.0
... austerity measures	-1.5	-1.2	-1.0
<i>Direct impact on the French economy</i>	-0.9	-0.8	-0.6
<i>Impact via addressed demand</i>	-0.6	-0.4	-0.4
Achievement	-0.1	0.3	0.1
Cumulative effect of shocks	-1.9	-1.6	-0.8
Other factors (housing investment, underestimation of accounts, declining potential, etc.)	-0.1	-0.4	-0.5
Spontaneous growth rate (excluding shocks)	2.4	2.4	2.4

Sources: INSEE, quarterly accounts; OFCE emod.fr forecast 2014-2015, made in October 2014.

In 2015, growth will pick up some, to +1.1%, due to the weakening of the negative factors that have stifled it since 2010, in particular credit conditions and austerity. Furthermore, the effect of price competitiveness, a factor that has played a very negative role in 2014, will be

reversed, due first to the depreciation of the euro, and second to the rising impact of the CICE tax credit, whose primary goal is to ensure lower export prices. But with GDP growth of 1.1% next year, the path towards expansion is still a long way from what can usually be seen during a post-crisis recovery (i.e. 2.4%). As the output gap is not closing, the anticipated growth cannot be deemed a recovery. Companies will benefit from this renewed pick-up to gradually restore their financial situation. This strategy is based primarily on increasing productivity, which will help to reduce surplus capacity and restore profit margins. The unemployment rate in metropolitan France will rise slightly to 9.9% in late 2015, and to 10.3% for France as a whole. The counterpart to loosening the austerity reins is a public deficit that is higher than what was originally programmed. It is expected to be 4.3% of GDP in 2015, departing significantly from its path back towards 3%.

Table 2. Summary of forecast for 2014 and 2015

%, annual average

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014*	2015*
GDP growth rate	2.0	2.1	0.4	0.4	0.4	1.1
Imports	8.5	6.5	-1.2	1.9	2.4	1.2
Household consumption	1.7	0.3	-0.5	0.3	0.2	1.3
Government consumption	1.2	1.0	1.7	2.0	1.8	1.1
Total investment	1.9	2.1	0.3	-0.8	-2.2	-1.6
Exports	8.6	7.1	1.2	2.4	2.5	2.6
<i>Contribution to growth</i>						
Domestic demand excl. inventory	1.8	1.0	0.3	0.4	0.0	0.6
Change in inventory	0.3	1.1	-0.6	-0.2	0.4	0.1
Trade balance	-0.1	0.0	0.7	0.1	0.0	0.4
Growth rate of euro zone GDP	1.9	1.6	-0.6	-0.4	0.9	1.4
<i>Other indicators</i>						
Inflation (consumption deflator)	1.2	1.8	1.4	0.6	0.6	0.7
Savings rate (% of GDI)	15.8	15.7	15.3	15.1	15.5	15.2
Unemployment rate	8.9	8.8	9.4	9.9	9.7	9.8
Public deficit (GDP points)	-6.8	-5.1	-4.9	-4.1	-4.5	-4.3
Public debt (GDP points)	81.5	85.0	89.2	92.2	95.4	97.4
GDP growth rate (year-on-year)	2.2	1.5	0.0	0.8	0.4	1.4

*OFCE e-mod.fr forecast for 2014 and 2015
Sources: INSEE, quarterly accounts; OFCE.

In order to meet its commitments on structural efforts and

nominal deficits, the government could decide to vote to make an additional effort of 8 billion euros. This would correspond to a 1.2 point hike in the standard rate of VAT. If that happens, GDP would grow no more than 0.8% next year, and the deficit would be reduced by only 0.2 GDP point, compared to our baseline scenario (Table 3).

Table 3. Impact on the French economy of an 8 billion euro hike in VAT

In %, difference from central accounts

Impact on ...	2015
... GDP	-0.3
... General government financing capacity (% GDP)	0.2
... Market sector employment (%)	-0.1
... Unemployment rate (percentage points)	0.1

Source: OFCE *emod.fr* forecast 2014-2015, made in October 2014.

France: gradual adjustments (forecasts)

[2014-2015 outlook for the French economy](#)

By [Éric Heyer](#), Marion Cochard, [Bruno Ducoudré](#) and Hervé Péléraux

In 2013, the French economy grew at an annual average rate of 0.3%, which enabled it to return to the level it had reached six years ago, in early 2008. Between 2008 and early 2011, the economy had shown resilience in comparison with the performance of France's main partners. In the first quarter of 2011, the country's GDP had even come close to regaining its pre-crisis level, and lagged only slightly behind Germany and the United States. But the situation changed in the second quarter of 2011 as the austerity measures introduced in 2010 began to have an impact. The initial spurts of recovery seen

after the recession were cut off. While the country did experience positive annual GDP growth, until 2013 this was close to zero. Ultimately, France is leaving this six-year period behind with an increased deficit that is still greater than the threshold of 3 GDP points. Fiscal consolidation has not proved very effective: the cost in terms of activity, unemployment and the financial situation for business has been disproportionate to the results.

In recent months, the economic situation in Europe has clarified considerably, with a return to growth and a strengthening of the main economic indicators. Business surveys also show a return of confidence in the productive sectors in France.

The relaxation of austerity should enable the French economy to continue along this path, with growth in GDP gradually picking up pace in 2014 and 2015.

For 2014, if we consider only the measures already approved, the French economy would grow by 1.2%, a level that is insufficient to bring down unemployment or to hit the 3.6% deficit target. The announcement by Manuel Valls in his general policy ("DPG") speech on 8 April 2014 of additional austerity measures of 4 billion euros through a supplementary budget prior to the summer should allow the government to meet its deficit commitment. But this will inevitably hurt activity and reduce the growth expected for the French economy to 1%, bringing the unemployment rate to 10.2% of the workforce by year-end.

Table 1. Measures announced in the General Policy (DPG) speech by Manuel Valls on 8 April 2014

		Date implemented	Amount in bn euros	Multiplier	Impact on growth (%)
	CICE tax credit yr 1	1 Jan 2014	9	1,0	0,5
	CICE yr 2	1 Jan 2015	7	0,8	0,3
	CICE yr 3	1 Jan 2016	1	0,8	0,0
	CICE yr 4	1 Jan 2017	2	0,8	0,1
	CICE yr 5	1 Jan 2018	1	0,8	0,0
Responsibility Pact	Reductions on low wages	1 Jan 2015	4,5	0,9	0,2
	Reductions wages > 1.6 SMIC	1 Jan 2016	4,5	0,8	0,2
	Reductions freelancers and artisans	1 Jan 2015	1	0,8	0,04
	TOTAL		30		1,4
Solidarity Pact	Reductions social contributions < 1.3 SMIC	1 Jan 2015	2,3	0,8	0,1
	Income tax reductions	2016-2017	2,7	0,7	0,1
	TOTAL		5		0,2
Tax base	Elimination of the C3S tax	2015	1	0,8	0,04
		2016-2017	4		0,16
	Elimination of the IS corporation surtax	2016	2,3	0,9	0,1
	Reduction in the IS corporation tax rate	Around 2020			

CICE = "Crédit d'impôt pour la compétitivité et l'emploi" (Tax credit for competitiveness and employment)

SMIC = French minimum wage

Sources: DPG speech, authors' calculations.

The DPG speech is also upsetting expectations for 2015: prior to this announcement we had forecast GDP growth of 1.6%. Companies would benefit from this renewed growth to gradually restore their financial positions. This strategy is based primarily on increasing productivity, which would help to reabsorb marginal production capacity and restore business margins. In this scenario, the public finances would also continue their gradual adjustment and the government deficit would come to 3% of GDP. As a corollary to the announced adjustment, the unemployment rate will continue to rise in 2015. The acceleration of the implementation of the Responsibility and Solidarity Pact promised in the DPG speech and the vagueness about how it will be funded may well affect the scenario set out above. Without new measures to cut public spending other than the 12 billion euros already included in our central scenario, the injection of 8.8 billion euros in

new measures (Table 1) would allow the French economy to achieve 2% growth in 2015, as it did in 2011. This growth, combined with the impact of reductions in social security contributions on low wages, would by the end of 2015 push the unemployment rate down to its end 2013 level of 9.8% of the labor force. The reduction in the fiscal stimulus to -0.1% of GDP, although partly offset by the impact of growth on tax revenues, will nevertheless take the scenario off the path set out by Brussels, with a public deficit of 3.2% of GDP. If new cost-cutting measures are taken to finance these new measures *ex ante* in 2015, then, given the higher fiscal multipliers for government spending, the positive impact on growth would vanish, and the general government deficit would surpass 3% (3.1% of GDP) and the unemployment rate would hit 10% at end 2015. This scenario appears worse than the central scenario with respect to public finances and growth, with the slight fall in the unemployment rate being due simply to the impact of reducing social contributions on low wages, leading to a larger proportion of low-wage jobs in total employment (Table 2).

Table 2. Summary of the forecast for 2014 and 2015

	2013	2014		2015		
		Before DPG	After DPG	Before DPG	After DPG	
					Not funded	Funded*
GDP (%)	0,3	1,2	1,0	1,6	2,0	1,5
Public deficit (% of GDP)	-4,3	-3,7	-3,6	-3,0	-3,2	-3,1
Unemployment rate*	9,8	10,0	10,1	10,1	9,8	10,0
Fiscal impulse	-1,2	-0,7	-0,9	-0,6	-0,1	-0,6

* It is assumed that the 9.3 billion euros in measures to reduce social contributions and income tax are financed by a reduction by the same amount in public spending, which would be added to the 50 billion already announced by the government.

Sources: INSEE, national accounts, authors' calculations.

Euro zone: Recovery or deflation?

By [Céline Antonin](#), [Christophe Blot](#), Sabine Le Bayon and Danielle Schweisguth

This text summarizes the [OFCE's forecast for 2014-2015 for the euro zone economy](#)

Will the euro zone embark on the road to recovery, or will it sink into a deflationary spiral? The latest macroeconomic indicators are sending out conflicting signals. A return to growth is being confirmed, with three consecutive quarters of rising GDP. However, the level of unemployment in the euro zone remains at a historically high level (11.9% for the month of February 2014), which is fuelling deflationary pressures, as is confirmed by the latest figures on inflation (0.5% yoy for March 2014). While this reduction in inflation is partly due to changes in energy prices, the fact remains that underlying inflation has fallen under 1% (Figure 1). In these conditions, a turnaround in inflationary expectations cannot be excluded, which would undoubtedly push the euro zone into deflation. The ECB has been concerned about this situation for several weeks and says it is ready to act (see [here](#)). However, no concrete proposal for a way to ease monetary policy and ensure that expectations are not anchored on a deflationary trajectory has been set out.


After a fall in GDP of 0.4% in 2013, the euro zone will return to positive growth: 1.3% in 2014 and 1.6% in 2015. Even so, at this rate of growth, there will still be an open output gap in most of the euro zone countries, reflecting the idea that the euro zone is only slowly pulling out of the crisis. Indeed, although efforts to reduce deficits will be curtailed, fiscal policies will still be pro-cyclical. Furthermore, financing conditions will continue to improve. The end of the sovereign

debt crisis, thanks in particular to the announcements by the ECB in July and September 2012 [\[1\]](#), has reduced the risk premiums on the market for government bonds. The impact of lower long-term market rates has been partly reflected in bank interest rates, and credit supply conditions are generally less restrictive than they were between early 2012 and mid-2013. But there will still not be sufficient growth to trigger a recovery strong enough to lead to a rapid and significant reduction in unemployment. Indeed, the level will fall only very moderately, from 11.9% in the first quarter of 2014 to 11.3% at year end 2015. While Germany will enjoy almost full employment, mass joblessness in Spain and the other countries of southern Europe will persist (Figure 2). Unemployment should stabilize in Italy and continue to grow in France.

However, this continuing underemployment is giving rise to the risk of deflation. It is holding back growth in wages and contributing to the weakness of underlying inflation, which was in fact zero in Spain in March 2013 and negative in Greece and Portugal. For the euro zone as a whole, we do not expect deflation in the short term, but the weakness of growth is increasing the likelihood that private agents' expectations are not anchored in a deflationary scenario.


The situation in the euro zone is reminiscent of Japan in the 2000s. The country began to experience deflation in 1999 [\[2\]](#) following the recession associated with the Asian crisis. At that point, despite average growth of 1.4% between 2000 and 2006, prices failed to pick up, and the country's central bank did not find a way out of this trap, despite trying expansionary monetary policies. This is precisely the dynamic threatening the euro zone today, making it crucial to use all possible means to avoid this (monetary policy, fiscal policy and the coordination of wage policy [\[3\]](#)).

Figure 1. Unemployment rate and inflation rate in the euro zone



Source : Eurostat.

Figure 2. Unemployment in the euro zone countries



Note : The other southern countries are Portugal and Greece. The other northern countries are the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, Austria and Finland.

Sources : Eurostat, OFCE forecast April 2014.

[1] In July, ECB President Mario Draghi declared that the central bank would save the euro “whatever it takes”. In

September, the ECB announced the creation of a new mechanism called Outright Monetary Transactions (see the post by [Jérôme Creel and Xavier Timbeau](#)), which enables it to engage in unlimited purchases of sovereign debt.

[2] It should be pointed out that there was an initial period of deflation in 1995 following three years of economic stagnation.

[3] All these elements are discussed in detail in the previous [iAGS](#) report (2014).

Growth in the 4th quarter of 2013, but ...

By Hervé Péléraux

According to the [OFCE's leading indicator](#), the French economy has grown by 0.5% in the fourth quarter of 2013. This result, which was anticipated, reflects the improvement in business surveys seen for about a year now. However, does this mark the return of GDP to a path of higher long-term growth? It is still too early to say.

The improvement in the business surveys anticipated the interruption in the second recession that took place in the first half of 2011. The national accounts then validated the signal emitted by the surveys, with renewed growth of 0.6% in the second quarter of 2013 (Table). GDP did of course fall again in the third quarter (-0.1%), but on average over the last two quarters there was growth of approximately 0.2% per quarter, a rate that, though very moderate, was still positive.

At the same time, the leading indicator, which aims to arrive at an estimate of GDP growth in the very short term by translating the cyclical information contained in the surveys, also pointed to a slow recovery in activity: on average over the last two quarters, growth was estimated at 0.1%, a figure that is slightly under the assessment of the national accounts.

Table. Rate of growth of French GDP according to the national accounts and the indicator

In %, Q/Q-1, chained prices, base 2005


	2012	2013				2014
	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1
National accounts	-0,2	-0,1	+0,6	-0,1	-	-
Indicator	-0,1	0,0	0,0	+0,1	+0,5	+0,2

Sources: INSEE, European Commission, OFCE calculations.

In the last few months, the uncontested growth in the confidence of private agents has enhanced the outlook for the end of 2013: the debate is now focusing on the possibility for the French economy to break through a turning point upwards and for growth to settle in at a level higher than the pace of long-term growth (0.35% per quarter).

Based on past experience, when the indicator has sent out warning signs of a turning point in the economic cycle, the signal issued for the fourth quarter of 2013 is indicating that the long-term growth rate of the French economy is being crossed (Figure). This signal is fragile: the still very partial information on the first quarter of 2014, i.e. the business surveys for January, point towards the growth rate falling below its potential. The possibility of a real lasting recovery that is able to create jobs and reverse the trend in unemployment is thus still very uncertain.

Figure. GDP growth – estimated and forecast



Sources: INSEE, European Commission, OFCE calculations.

Note on the leading indicator:

The leading indicator aims to forecast the quarterly growth rate for French GDP two quarters beyond the latest available data. The components of the indicator are selected from survey data sets that are rapidly available and unrevised. The selection of the data series is made on an econometric basis, starting from the business surveys carried out in different productive sectors (industry, construction, services, retail) and among consumers. Two series related to the international environment are also significant: the rate of growth of the real exchange rate of the euro against the dollar, and the real growth rate of oil prices.

Some components are at least two quarters in advance and as such can be used to predict GDP growth. Others are coincidental, or are not sufficiently advanced to make a forecast two quarters ahead. These series need to be forecast, but over a short-term horizon that never exceeds four months.

The leading indicator is calculated at the beginning of each month, shortly after the publication of the business and consumer surveys.

Revisions of the growth potential: the impact on deficits

By Hervé Péléraux

Public finances – battered by the Great Recession

At the end of the Great Recession of 2008/09, the fiscal problem that governments had to face was seemingly simple, as was the solution put forward. The operation of the automatic stabilizers and the stimulus packages put in place to counter the 2008/09 recession sharply increased the public deficits. This situation, which was dictated by urgency, was acceptable in the short term, but not in the longer term. Logically this would lead to an adjustment in the public accounts to reduce the deficits and halt the growth of the debt. Fiscal discipline at a forced pace under the baton of the European Commission was therefore the economic policy instrument adopted by almost all the euro zone countries.

The appropriateness of this strategy, which was undertaken to solve the initial problem, i.e. the excessive deficits in the euro zone, should nevertheless be discussed. It relied on a macroeconomic diagnosis made at the end of the recession in 2008/09 that conditioned the assessment on the spontaneous

capacity for an economic recovery – in effect, the fraction of the public deficit that was likely to be spontaneously absorbed by renewed growth depended on this capacity for recovery.

Part of the deficits could be absorbed on their own

The public deficit excluding interest expense, i.e. the primary deficit, can be subdivided into two components: a cyclical component and a structural component. The cyclical component results from cyclical fluctuations in GDP around its potential, that is to say, the level of GDP achievable without inflationary pressures using the available production factors: during a phase when GDP is slowing relative to its growth potential, and thus when the output gap is widening, tax revenues slow, and public spending, in particular on social welfare, picks up. What follows is a spontaneous increase in the deficit. In economic theory this self-corrective mechanism is called the “automatic stabilizers”. The other component of the deficit is deduced from the previous one as a complement to the total deficit: this is the deliberate component, which results from the impact of economic policy. This discretionary component can be eliminated only by implementing a policy that is symmetrical to what gave rise to it, that is to say, by means of an austerity policy. By its nature it has a dampening effect on the recovery, whereas the expansionary policy during the previous phase results in boosting activity. Fiscal policy is thus an instrument for smoothing the economic cycle.

The spontaneous portion of the deficit that appeared after the 2008/09 recession was destined to be automatically reduced once growth returned. Only the elimination of the discretionary component justified a restrictive policy. The extent of the effort needed to achieve this therefore depended on the measurement of the output gap, which conditioned the estimate of the cyclical deficit, and by inference the estimate of the deliberate deficit.

The cycle's effect on the evaluation of the potential

The measurement of the output potential that is used to calculate the output gap is obviously central for calibrating as accurately as possible the budget cuts needed to eliminate the portion of the deficit that cannot be absorbed spontaneously by growth. But policymakers face a major difficulty here, i.e. the unobservable nature of the potential, which consequently must be estimated – and economists are far from unanimous about these estimates. Moreover, periodic revisions can be significant even within the same institution, which modifies the diagnosis made and – if this institution happens to be responsible for defining the rules constraining fiscal policy, as in the case of the European Commission (EC) – the measures to be taken as well.


A review of the revisions of the growth potential calculated by the EC shows the uncertainty of this estimate (see last section below). The estimate also appears to depend on current growth, which is somewhat paradoxical for an estimate of a supply function that depends on long-term economic parameters such as increases in the labour force, productivity and the capital stock. It is understandable that the trajectory of these supply parameters is deflected slightly during cyclical hiccups, particularly through investment, which is a vehicle for technical progress and ensures the growth of capital or a loss in human capital due to long-term unemployment. But the fact that the inclusion in the estimates of a cyclical phenomenon, even one as massive as the recession of 2008/09, is leading to revisions of the growth potential on the order of that seen between Spring 2008 and Spring 2009 raises questions. This is particularly so as these revisions have also affected the years prior to the recession, which were not affected by changes in the conditions of accumulation. Thereafter, the resumption of growth in 2010 led to revisions of the growth potential in the other direction, including for the years prior to the recession. Finally, the economic

downturn in 2011 led to a further series of revisions, once again downwards.

Self-sustained austerity

The reduction in growth potential led to significant revisions downwards of the estimated output gap (see chart). These are not neutral for calibrating the fiscal consolidation policy. This is because for a given deficit, the estimate of the output gap of -2% for 2010, for example, versus nearly -6% under the assumption of a continuation of the trajectory of potential GDP estimated before the recession, would increase the part of the perceived structural deficit and thus call for heightened austerity. That's what happened in 2010, when the stimulus packages gave way to plans for drastic budget cuts. Generalized to all member countries, they nipped the nascent recovery in the bud and plunged the euro zone countries into a new recession.

Revision of the euro zone's growth potential



Sources: European Commission, Eurostat.

The excessive sensitivity of the estimate of potential growth to current growth precipitated the commitment to austerity

policies in the euro zone and subsequently pushed towards tightening fiscal restraint further. By depressing economic activity, austerity fuelled factors that undercut supply through the destruction of capital, a slowdown in investment and deskilling the labour supply. The economies' capacity for a spontaneous recovery was thus undermined, which could only lead to an increase in the share of the structural deficit in the total deficit, and ultimately to the need for greater austerity.

The budget purge thus led to a second recession, which invalidated the deficit reduction targets set at the beginning, as the automatic stabilizers have again increased the cyclical component of the deficit. Rigour, poorly calibrated, was counter-productive and thus could not achieve the initial goal of rapid deficit reduction. The results are far from being commensurate with the sacrifices made by the European economies.

The European Commission's estimate of the euro zone's potential GDP

The 2008/09 recession led the European Commission to revise its estimate of the growth potential for the member countries rather significantly. For the euro zone as a whole, the revision process began between Spring 2008 and Spring 2009, when the effects of the financial crisis were expressed in real activity: the start of the recession in the euro zone in the fourth quarter of 2008 was associated with sharp downward revisions of the growth potential for 2008 and 2009, by -0.7 and -1.2 points, respectively (Table). There were also relatively substantial revisions to earlier years, from -0.3 to -0.5 points for the years 2004 to 2007. However, no major revision occurs between the estimates of Spring 2009 and Spring 2010, despite the downturn in year-on-year GDP growth,

indicating that the modification of the economic landscape had already been included in the estimates.

The growth potential has been revised not only downwards, but also upwards when growth picked up after the recession. Between Spring 2010 and Spring 2011, the revisions were spread from +0.1 to +0.3 points and also affected more distant years. Finally, a new series of downward revisions took place with the second economic downturn in 2011. The years prior to 2008 changed little, but they fall within a broader range for the years 2008 to 2013, from -0.2 to -0.8 points, which for 2012 amounts to dividing the potential growth rate by two and a half.

Table. Revisions of the euro zone's growth potential

	Spring 2008	Spring 2009	Spring 2010	Spring 2011	Spring 2012	Spring 2013
2004	1,9	1,6	1,7	1,9	1,9	1,9
2005	1,9	1,5	1,6	1,7	1,8	1,8
2006	2,0	1,5	1,5	1,8	1,8	1,8
2007	2,1	1,6	1,5	1,8	1,8	1,7
2008	2,0	1,3	1,3	1,6	1,4	1,4
2009	1,9	0,7	0,8	0,9	0,7	0,6
2010		0,7	0,8	1,0	0,7	0,6
2011			1,0	1,1	0,8	0,7
2012				1,1	0,6	0,4
2013					0,7	0,4
2014						0,5
GDP growth * (year on year)	1,0	-1,3	-2,1	2,0	0,7	-0,9

* The year-on-year GDP growth shown here corresponds to the latest national accounts known at the time when the estimate is made, i.e. Q4 for the preceding year for the European Commission's Spring estimate. These figures are calculated with the GDP as is known at the time, i.e. with the version available at the beginning of the month of April for each year.

Sources: European Commission, Eurostat.

The effect of current growth on the estimation of growth potential by the European Commission is thus obvious. This results in a high variability of the growth potential and therefore significant revisions of the output gap, which affects economic policy decisions since the structural balance depends on this evaluation.


Renewed growth in the United Kingdom in 2013: trompe-l'oeil effects

By [Catherine Mathieu](#)

The latest estimate of the British national accounts, published on 27 November, confirmed GDP growth of 0.8% in the third quarter of 2013, following 0.7% in the second quarter and 0.4% in the first quarter. This represents a sparkling performance for the UK economy, especially in comparison with the euro zone. GDP was up 1.5% year on year in the third quarter of 2013 in the UK, against -0.4% in the euro zone, 0.2% in France and 0.6% in Germany. In the eyes of some observers, Britain's return to growth shows that fiscal austerity does not undermine growth ... on the contrary. But the argument seems at a minimum questionable.

Let's look at the numbers a little more closely. Admittedly, GDP is up 1.5% year on year in the third quarter, but it rose by only 0.1% in 2012 and is still 2.5 percentage points below its pre-crisis level: this does not really represent a great success. Even more striking has been the change in GDP since the start of the crisis: GDP initially fell 7 points between the first quarter of 2008 and the second quarter of 2009; the recovery then got underway, allowing GDP to rise 2 points in the third quarter of 2010, before it fell again. The GDP trajectory since the third quarter of 2010 has been quite unusual with respect to recoveries from previous crises (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Change In British GDP during recessions and recoveries



Source: Office for National Statistics (ONS).

In 2008, the United Kingdom was one of the first industrialized countries to implement a recovery plan. Gordon Brown, Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Tony Blair government, lowered the standard VAT rate by 2.5 percentage points in December 2008 in an effort to boost household consumption. The measure, which was announced as temporary, was ended in late 2009. In 2009, fiscal policy was highly expansionary, with a fiscal impulse of 2.8 percent of GDP following a 0.6 point impulse in 2008 (Table 1). The public deficit increased under the dual impact of the recession and fiscal policy, as did the public debt.

In May 2010, the Conservatives won the election on a programme focused on reducing the public debt and deficit. This was supposed to ensure market confidence and maintain the AAA rating of Britain's public debt, and thus keep the interest rate on the debt at a low level. This was combined with a very active monetary policy, with the Bank of England maintaining its key rate at 0.5%, buying government securities and making great efforts to facilitate the refinancing of banks and kick-start lending to businesses and households. The resumption of growth was supposed to come from business investment and

exports.

The fiscal policy implemented by the David Cameron government has therefore been highly restrictive. At first, the measures focused on increasing revenue by raising the VAT rate and cutting spending, including on social benefits. The resumption of growth was interrupted. Fiscal policy had also become restrictive elsewhere in Europe, so economic activity slowed in the UK's main trading partners. In 2012, fiscal austerity was sharply curtailed (Table 1). The growth figures in recent times are a long way from demonstrating the success of austerity.

Table 1. Growth and fiscal impulses in the United Kingdom since 2008


	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Growth	-0,8	-5,2	1,7	1,1	0,1
Fiscal impulse	0,6	2,8	-2,7	-3,2	-0,5

Sources : Office for National Statistics (ONS), OECD, author's estimates.

It is also important to note that David Cameron has excluded health expenditure from his cost-cutting plan. The British are attached to their public health care system, and the newly elected Conservatives were determined in 2010 not to repeat the mistake made in the 1980s when Margaret Thatcher was head of government. So fiscal austerity has not hit the health sector. The result is clear in terms of activity: value added (by volume) in the health sector is now 15 points above its pre-crisis level – in other words, it has continued to grow at an average annual rate of nearly 3% (Figure 2). The second sector where activity has remained strong since 2008, and which has even accelerated since the end of 2012, is real estate. Property prices in the UK had risen sharply before the crisis, leading to record household debt, and have not dropped much since then. Indeed, they have remained historically high and even begun to rise from 2012 (at an annual rate of about 5%). But other sectors are lagging behind. Most services have for instance only now regained the level of pre-crisis output, and some of them are still well below this level: -9% for

financial services and insurance, which is comparable to the figure for manufacturing, while output in the building sector is down 13%.

Figure 2. : Changes in added value (in volume) by sector since the onset of the crisis



Source: Office for National Statistics (ONS).

Since 2008, British growth has thus been driven in part by a public service spared from fiscal austerity and by real estate services supported by an ultra-active monetary policy... The British recovery could, moreover, give birth to a new housing bubble. Household consumption is now the main engine of growth (Table 2). The failure of investment to pick up represents one of the main setbacks suffered by the supply-side policy implemented since 2010 by the government. The government wants to make the UK tax system the most competitive in the G20, and to this end has slashed the corporate tax rate to the lowest in the G20 (the rate, lowered to 23% this year, will be only 20% in 2015). But business investment has nevertheless not picked up again. The government is also relying on exports to drive growth, but given the economic situation prevailing in Britain's main foreign markets, in particular the euro zone, this is just not realistic. After having experienced sustained growth in previous quarters, boosted by strong sales outside the European Union until the summer, exports have contributed to a sharp fall-off in growth in the third quarter (-0.8 GDP point). As the British government prepares to present its

budget on 5 December, support for fiscal policy would be welcome to help keep the UK economy on the road to recovery in the coming months...

Tableau 2. Contributions of demand components to growth

In GDP points (except GDP)

	2010		2011		2012		2013	
	1st half	2nd half	1st half	2nd half	1st half	2nd half	1st half	2nd half
GDP, in %	1,3	0,8	0,4	0,6	-0,3	0,2	0,6	0,8
Household consumption	0,2	0,6	-0,6	0,1	0,5	0,4	0,6	0,5
Spending by general government	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,4	-0,1	0,1	0,1
GFCF	0,7	0,2	-0,4	0,1	0,5	-0,8	-0,2	0,2
Productive private	0,6	0,0	-0,2	0,1	0,4	-0,5	-0,2	0,1
Change in inventory	1,0	0,4	0,0	0,6	-1,0	0,7	-0,2	0,9
Foreign trade	-0,5	-0,3	1,5	-0,2	-0,6	-0,0	0,2	-0,9
Exports	1,1	1,1	0,7	0,2	0,1	0,3	0,2	-0,8
Imports	-1,5	-1,4	0,8	-0,4	-0,6	-0,3	-0,0	-0,1

Note: Half-year contributions, except * 3rd qtr contributions. The sum of the contributions may not correspond exactly to GDP growth, due to rounding.

Source: Office for National Statistics.