

# After the Paris Agreement – Putting an end to climate inconsistency

By [Eloi Laurent](#)

If the contents of the 32-page Paris Agreement (and the related decisions) adopted on 12 December 2015 by COP 21 had to be summarized in a single phrase, we could say that never have the ambitions been so high but the constraints so low. This is the basic trade-off in the text, and this was undoubtedly the condition for its adoption by all the world's countries. The expectation had been that the aim in Paris was to extend to the emerging markets, starting with China and India, the binding commitments agreed in Kyoto eighteen years ago by the developed countries. What took place was exactly the opposite: under the leadership of the US government, which dominated this round of negotiations from start to finish right to the last minute (and where the EU was sorely absent), every country is now effectively out of Annex 1 of the Kyoto Protocol. They are released from any legal constraints on the nature of their commitments in the fight against climate change, which now amount to voluntary contributions that countries determine on their own and without reference to a common goal.

In doing this, the Paris Agreement gives rise to a new global variable, which we can accurately track over the coming years: the factor of inconsistency, which compares objectives and resources. At the end of COP 21, this ratio was in the range of 1.35 to 2 (the climate objective chosen, specified in Article 2, lies between 1.5 and 2 degrees, whereas the sum of national voluntary contributions declared to reach this would lead to warming of 2.7 to 3 degrees). The question facing us now is thus the following: how to deal with this climate

inconsistency by bringing the resources deployed into line with the ambitions declared (bringing the climate inconsistency factor to 1)?

The answers to this question were actually set out during the two weeks of COP 21, but they did not survive the negotiations between states and therefore were not included in the final text in an operational form. They are three in number: climate justice, the carbon price and the mobilization of territories.

Climate justice, whose decisive importance was rightly highlighted in particular in the opening speech of the French President ("It is in the name of climate justice that I speak to you today") is actually contradicted in the text of the Agreement: while the text mentions the term "justice" only a single time, it provides that the parties recognize "the importance for some of the concept of 'climate justice'". The whole point of climate justice is precisely that its importance is not confined to only a few nations but concerns all the world's countries. So there is still a huge amount to be done in this field, particularly on the question of the distribution of efforts at mitigation and adaptation.

The need to put a price on carbon (and thus give it social value), which has been gaining in support, as was highlighted from the opening of COP 21 under the aegis of Angela Merkel and the new Canadian government, still appeared in the penultimate version of the text. It disappeared from the final version (under the combined pressure of Saudi Arabia and Venezuela). Yet there is no doubt that it is by internalizing the price of carbon that we will put the economy at the service of the climate transition. But it seems at this point that the world's governments have decided to outsource this internalization function to the private sector. It is necessary to quickly take this in hand, both internally and globally.

Finally, the way the Agreement deals with the crucial role of

decentralized territories, both to compensate for the shortcomings of the nation states and to be laboratories for a low-carbon economy, is too brief and too vague. The summit organized by the Mayor of Paris on December 4 nevertheless showed clearly that towns, cities and regions have become full participants in the fight against climate change, reviving the spirit of the 1992 Rio Summit. It is essential to set up as quickly as possible an organization for genuine cooperation between the territories and the nation states, in France and elsewhere, to breathe life into the Paris Agreement.

It can be seen clearly in the light of these three decisive issues, that the most severe criticism that can be levelled at an architectural agreement, which is a programme of intentions rather than an actual plan for action, is not to be progressive and dynamic enough and not to anticipate sufficiently its own shortcomings and its coming outdatedness by opening the way for new principles, new instruments and new players. Moreover, what are we to make of the fact that we have to wait until 2020 for its implementation, while the signs of climate change are visible all around us?

The easing of this time constraint may well come from the big country that proved to be the most constructive before and during COP 21: China. It was China that, five days before the conclusion of the Agreement, was the source of the best climate news since the announcement of the slowing of Amazon deforestation in the 2000s: global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, after almost stabilizing in 2014, should decrease slightly in 2015. This decrease is due to their reduction in China under the combined impact of the economic slowdown (the decision to end hyper-growth) and the de-carbonization of growth (related to lower consumption of coal). This is in turn due to the increasingly strong pressure being placed by the Chinese people on their government, because they have understood that the economic development of their country is destroying the human development of their children. It can thus be hoped that China

will contain global emissions over the five years between now and 2020 and thereby make the Paris Agreement more acceptable... on the condition of using this to put an end to climate inconsistency.

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# Our house is on fire and we are only watching Paris

By Paul Malliet

As the 21st Conference of the Parties, COP21, began last week, all eyes were on Paris in the expectation of an ambitious global agreement that would limit the increase in global average temperature to 2°C and lead countries to begin swiftly to decarbonize their economies. But there is another battle taking place right now that is being ignored, even though it could have catastrophic consequences.

The primary forests and peatlands of Indonesia, located mainly on the islands of Sumatra and Kalimantan (and considered one of the Earth's three green lungs), have been ravaged by fire for months as a result of an unexpectedly long dry season, which was in turn fueled by an extremely large-scale El Niño phenomenon<sup>[1]</sup>, but also and above all by the continuation of slash and burn practices, which, though illegal, are intended to deforest the land needed to expand the cultivation of palm oil.

This led to the release of 1.62 gigatons of CO<sub>2</sub> into the atmosphere in the space of a few weeks, tripling Indonesia's annual emissions and pushing the country up from the planet's

6th largest emitter to 4th, behind China, the US and India and ahead of Russia[2]. By way of comparison, this represents nearly 5% of global emissions for the year 2015.

Yet the issue of deforestation was central to Indonesia's contribution to the global effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, accounting for more than 80% of the effort agreed[3] up to now. Moreover, under the UN REDD+ (Reduction Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) mechanism, launched in 2008, Indonesia has benefitted from \$1 billion of international funding since 2011 precisely in order to fight against deforestation and to promote the management of sustainable forests.

However, due to the lack of a rapid and substantial response that would undoubtedly have contained the fires, this effort has literally gone up in smoke in recent months. Three reasons for this can be put forward at this stage. The first concerns the material capacities that Indonesia has for responding to disasters like this. For example, the authorities had only 14 aircraft, and relied mainly on the local population to fight the spread of forest fires by building containment basins. The second element concerns regional geopolitical issues. Indonesia has some diplomatic tension with its neighbors, and the fires raged for a number of weeks before the government agreed to accept international aid. Finally, the existence of a culture of corruption at various levels of government has led to years of deforestation, further weakening the ecosystems facing fire hazards.

Nevertheless, it is utterly clear today that discussion about the ways and means for dealing with climate disasters like this are completely missing from the discussions going on in the COP 21 process. It is more urgent than ever that the international community is capable of providing a framework that includes the capabilities for responding to these types of events, which unfortunately are likely to occur with increasing frequency, with consequences liable to profoundly

affect regional relations. Strengthening funding for the fight against deforestation is of course paramount, especially since in this case the cost of avoiding a ton of CO<sub>2</sub> is very low; but it is mainly at the level of practices that substantial progress can still be made, either by introducing greater transparency in fund management or through greater integration of local communities and NGOs in the implementation of new practices.

In his opening speech at COP 21, Francois Hollande declared that, “what is at stake with this climate conference is peace”. The conditions for peace are indeed likely to depend increasingly on societies’ capacity to adapt to climate risks. The disaster of World War II led the international community to create a body of peacekeepers with a mandate for “the maintenance or restoration of peace and international security”. How many ecological disasters will be required before we see the appearance of green helmets?

[\[1\]](#) According to the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the 2015-2016 El Niño is listed as one of the three most powerful recorded since data began to be collected in 1950, and the coming decades are likely to see extreme events occur with heightened frequency as a result of climate change.

[\[2\]](#) World Resources Institute, *With Latest Fires Crisis, Indonesia Surpasses Russia as World’s Fourth-Largest Emitter*, 29 October 2015.


[\[3\]](#) In 2009 Indonesia undertook to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 29%, or even 41% (with international aid), compared to a baseline scenario (Source: National Action Plan for Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction (RAN-GRK)).

# The end of oil and coal

By [Xavier Timbeau](#)

The idea that we must put an end to the use of oil and coal is not new. It has been pushed for a long time by NGOs like [350.org](#) and its [gofossilfree](#) campaign. What is more striking is that the Democratic primary candidate Senator Bernie Sanders has put [the proposal](#) at the heart of the US presidential election debate. Institutional investors and large fund holders have also announced their intention to limit or terminate their investments in coal (for example, Allianz and ING) and oil (the Dutch pension fund ABP). The urban development policies of some large cities are also leaning in that direction. Asked about this option, the head of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Gina McCarthy, noted (cautiously) that this [option](#) was not irrational.

**Figure: Scenarios of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions**



Source: Figure SMP 11, AR5, IPCC, p. 21.

That said, [Figure SPM 11 of the 5th IPCC report](#) says much the same thing. If global warming is to be kept to 2 degrees, our carbon budget since 1870 amounts to  $2900 \pm 250$  GtCO<sub>2</sub>e; we have consumed around 1900 GtCO<sub>2</sub>e up to now. So staying below the 2°C level (relative to pre-industrial times) with a probability of 66% leaves about 1000 GtCO<sub>2</sub>e. Given an annual flow of emissions of about 50 GtCO<sub>2</sub>e, a simple rule of three give us 40 years of linearly decreasing emissions. The inclusion of carbon sinks, climate inertia and negative [radiative forcings](#) on the climate extends the time horizon to  $2090 \pm 10$  years, but it would be prudent to get down to zero emissions earlier. For the record, there are still about  $5000 \pm 1400$  GtCO<sub>2</sub> of recoverable reserves in coal alone, enough to greatly exceed our current carbon budget. Note that stopping the use of fossil fuels does not solve everything. A portion of current greenhouse gas emissions (of CO<sub>2</sub>, but also of methane and other gases) is not linked to fossil fuels but to farming, deforestation and industrial processes. In the case of a nearly 100% system of renewable energy, the gas would be necessary during consumption peaks. These non-fossil emissions can be cut down, but not eliminated. It is possible to have negative emissions, but the only “technology” available today is reforestation, which can help lower emissions by only 2 GtCO<sub>2</sub> annually. Carbon capture and storage is also a way to conserve the use of fossil fuels provided that it works and that it has enough storage capacity (once the storage capacity is depleted, the problem remains).

The principle of “common but differentiated responsibility” would lead the developed countries to apply constraints more quickly (by say around 2050). Some see this prospect as the explanation for the fall in oil prices. Since not all fossil fuel reserves will be burned, the only ones worth anything are those that will be exploited before 2050, meaning that this price is lower than what would result from rising demand. Saudi Arabia therefore has an interest in increasing production rather than keeping worthless reserves. Mark



Carney, Governor of the Bank of England and Chairman of the Financial Stability Board, has [evoked “stranded reserves”](#) in the same way that a coal plant is a “stranded asset”, i.e. a blocked asset that has to be depreciated prematurely.

The end of oil and coal is no longer just a fad of a handful of green activists. This is also seen in the [persistent and nearly convergent calls of many economists about a carbon price](#). A high and rising price of carbon would force economic agents to disinvest in the capital that emits carbon or even to prematurely depreciate existing facilities. When a high carbon price is demanded (say between 50 and 100 € / tCO<sub>2</sub>, with the price of carbon steadily increasing over time as the carbon budget runs out), the point is that this sends a strong price signal to economic agents, with the consequence of this price being that emissions are reduced in an amount consistent with warming of less than 2°C compared to pre-industrial times. So, from this viewpoint, saying that “the price of carbon should be 50 € / tCO<sub>2</sub> or more” is equivalent to saying “everything must be done so that we stop using coal and oil within the next half century”. The price of carbon thus gives us valuable information about the cost of the transition. It will be on the order of (a few) 1000 billion euros per year (on the scale of the global economy). Proposing a price means proposing the “polluter pays” principle (carbon emitters must pay), even though it is not clear exactly whom the polluters must pay. Hence the debate on the Green Fund and climate justice that is at the centre of COP21.

It would be a shame to focus on the carbon price and make it the central issue of COP21. A zero-carbon economy is our future, and we will have no excuses if we continue to burn fossil fuels. As Oscar Wilde remarked: “Nowadays people know the price of everything and the value of nothing.”

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# The COP 21 conference: the necessity of compromise

By [Aurélien Saussay](#)

On Tuesday, 6 October 2015, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) released a preliminary version of the draft agreement that will form the basis for negotiations at the Paris Conference in December. Six years after the Copenhagen agreement, widely described as a failure, the French Secretariat is making every effort to ensure the success of COP 21 – at the cost of a certain number of compromises. Although the text's ambitiousness has been cut down, the strategy of taking "small steps" is what can make an agreement possible.

The project has renounced a binding approach, where each country's contributions were negotiated simultaneously, and replaced that with a call for voluntary contributions, where each country makes its commitments separately. This step was essential: the Kyoto Protocol, though ambitious, was never ratified by the United States, the world's principal emitter of carbon at the time – and it was the attempt to build a successor on that same model which resulted in the lack of agreement at Copenhagen.

The countries' commitments, called Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC), fall into three broad categories: a reduction in emissions from the level of a given base year – generally used by the developed countries; a reduction in the intensity of emissions relative to GDP (the amount of GHGs emitted per unit of GDP produced); and finally, the relative reduction in emissions compared to a baseline

scenario, called “business-as-usual”, which represents the projected trajectory of emissions in the absence of specific measures.

Most emerging countries have chosen to express their targets in terms of intensity (China and India in particular) or relative to a baseline trajectory (Brazil, Mexico and Indonesia). This type of definition has the advantage of not penalizing their economic development – at the price, of course, of uncertainty about the level of the target: if economic growth exceeds the projections used, the target could be met even while the reduction in emissions achieved would be lower than expected. Moreover, part of the target is often indexed on the availability of financing and of technology transfers from developed countries – once again, a perfectly legitimate condition. Due to the contribution that having a plurality of targets makes to a fair distribution of efforts between developed, long-standing emitters and countries that have been developing recently, this represents an essential source of compromise.

With regards to the level of emissions targets set for 2030, while some are trivial – note the case of Australia, which is proposing *to increase* its emissions over 1990 levels – many involve accelerating existing efforts. To meet its commitments, Europe must reduce its emissions twice as rapidly from 2020 to 2030 as it does in the previous decade, and the United States one-and-a-half times; China will need to reduce its carbon intensity three times faster than it has in the last five years, and India two-and-a-half times faster.

As a guide, if the INDCs made public to date were fully realized, then according to the research consortium Climate Action Tracker [\[1\]](#), global temperatures would rise 2.7 °C above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century. This simple calculation must, however, be qualified, since the plan is for commitments to be revised every five years, and they can only be tightened. This system of iterative negotiations

should make it possible to move steadily closer to the goal of 2°C that is still being upheld officially.

To be effective, it is necessary to check on whether these commitments are actually met, which requires independent monitoring. In this respect, while guidelines have been highlighted in the current version of the draft agreement, the final negotiations will need to clarify the mechanisms actually used. In the absence of an effective verification procedure, successive revaluations of commitments could turn into a global game of liar's poker, and ultimately undermine the fight against climate change.

Moreover, the existence of relatively ambitious commitments should certainly not delay the implementation of the necessary adaptation measures, which are at present the subject of a single article in the provisional draft, with no reference to the funding that will be devoted to this. This is one of the project's main weaknesses, as the question of funding is barely mentioned – the Green Climate Fund, which was to be endowed with 100 billion dollars by 2010, has received only 10.2 billion to date.

In turning the page on Copenhagen, the draft agreement for Paris could constitute a real step forward for climate protection. It is the result of a change in method and a series of compromises which, though scaling down ambitions, are absolutely necessary to the very existence of an agreement. Demanding greater requirements for the proposal's targets could lead to the failure of the negotiations, which would be far more damaging. In its current version, the draft agreement provides a robust foundation for the future coordination of efforts against climate change.

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[\[1\]](#) The Consortium of the following research organizations: Climate Analytics, Ecofys, NewClimate Institute, and Potsdam

Institute for Climate Impact Research.