

# A new Great Moderation?

by Analysis and Forecasting Department

This text summarizes the OFCE's 2017-2019 forecast for the global economy and the euro zone; the full version can be found [here](#).

Ten years after the financial crisis broke out in the summer of 2007, the world economy finally seems to be embarking on a trajectory of more solid growth in both the industrialized and most of the emerging countries. The figures for the first half of 2017 indicate that global growth is accelerating, which should result in GDP growth of 3.3% over the year as a whole, up 0.3 percentage point over the previous year. Some uncertainty remains, of course, in particular concerning the outcome of Brexit and the ability of the Chinese authorities to control their economic slowdown, but these are the types of irreducible uncertainties characteristic of an economic system that is subject to political, technological, economic and financial shocks[1]. Beyond these risks, which should not be underestimated, lies the question of the ability of the world's economies to reduce the imbalances inherited from the crisis. While current growth is sufficient to bring down the unemployment rate and improve the employment rate, it needs to be long-lasting enough to get back to full employment, reduce inequalities, and promote debt reduction.

In this respect, not all the doubts have been lifted by the current upturn in the world's economic situation. First, growth has remained moderate in light of the past recession and previous episodes of recovery. Since 2012, the global economy has grown at an average rate of 3.2%, which is lower than in the 2000s (graphic). The growth trajectory seems to be closer to what was observed in the 1980s and 1990s. This period, the so-called Great Moderation, was characterized by lower macroeconomic volatility and a disinflationary trend,

first in the advanced countries, then in the emerging countries. This second element is also an important point in the global economic situation today. Indeed, the pick-up in growth is not translating into renewed inflation. The low rate of inflation reflects the persistence of underemployment in the labor market, which is holding back wage growth. It also illustrates the difficulties the central banks are having in (re)-anchoring inflation expectations on their target.

Finally, there is the matter of the growth potential. Despite numerous uncertainties about measuring growth potential, many estimates are converging on a projection of weaker long-term growth, due mainly to a slowdown in trend productivity. It should be noted, however, that the methods used to determine this growth trajectory sometimes lead to prolonging recent trends, and can therefore become self-fulfilling if they lead private and public agents to reduce their spending in anticipation of a slowdown in growth. Conversely, boosting future growth requires private and public investment. Economic policies must therefore continue to play a leading role in supporting the recovery and creating the conditions for future growth.

**Figure. The recovery of the global economy**



Sources: National accounts, OFCE calculations, October 2017.

[1] See OFCE (2017): [La routine de l'incertitude](#) [in French].

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# Is Emmanuel Macron approving a new industrial policy for France?

By [Sarah Guillou](#)

Support for industry is an economic issue that wins adherence from both Right and Left. The entire French political spectrum agrees on the importance of industry for the economy's future. There is also a consensus among economists, who bring together a variety of sensitivities in recognizing the leading role industry plays in driving growth, mainly through exports and innovations – the manufacturing sector is responsible for over 70% of total exports and more than 75% of total R&D spending. This consensus is even international, to such an extent that, paraphrasing Robert Reich, it could be said that, “on the battlefield of national economic ambition, industry is the new boots on the ground”.

In France, everyone also agrees on deploring the decline in industrial jobs and more generally the de-industrialization that has seen industry's share of total employment fall from 25% in 1990 to 10% in 2014. Deindustrialization, which has intensified since the 2007 crisis, crystallizes all the concerns about globalization and all the reproaches made to the French fiscal and regulatory environment.

Governments in general have been quick to support industry and

have set up programmes to support innovation, SMEs and R&D spending. The research tax credit (CIR) set up in 1983 has been reinforced by government after government, and perfectly illustrates the political consensus on the matter. But since then numerous programmes to aid companies have been added, creating a tangle of schemes and local and national institutions, leading [a recent OECD report](#) to label the result relatively incoherent.

Unfortunately, it is clear that France's economic and political consensus has not led to making its industry a global singularity in terms of performance. The country's industrial policy has been unable to counteract the inexorable decline of industry in the face of the service sector.

But judging industrial policy in this way misconstrues its possible objectives. To understand what industrial policy involves, we need to shed our old habits.

On the one hand, opposing industry to services is outdated and is merely a statistical artefact. The services sector is poised to take over innovation and exports, but our statistics have not yet taken stock of these changes. We are still not very clear on how to measure productivity in services or how to understand the channels for innovation in this sector, which do not necessarily pass through R&D. Note, however, that among the companies that benefit from the CIR research tax credit, the number of services firms is increasing every year, reflecting their growing contribution to private R&D spending. Services are a very heterogeneous category: the "Information and communication" category, for example, is less distant from the manufacturing sector than from the real estate business. Furthermore, exports of services are still not well measured (or declared) and are not always very distinguishable from movements of capital. Veiled behind these imperfections in statistics, globalization is not sparing the services sector, which will form an increasing share of international transactions.

Still, for the moment, it is undeniable that the manufacturing sector governs R&D's share of GDP and that the decline in France's market share reveals the productive difficulties companies are experiencing. But we must begin now to anticipate the changes taking place in the boundaries between sectors and not become locked into a reading of economic activity that is incapable of grasping the areas where added value will be created in the future. Re-industrialization in the sense of increasing the role of manufacturing (or "a return to the age of doing") is not necessarily the salvation of the economy of the future.

At the same time, industrial policy as such was not responsible for de-industrialization, nor is it able to counteract the decline in industrial employment.

The reasons for de-industrialization – beyond the important role played by technical progress – are to be found in the conditions governing the exercise of economic activity in France relative to the rest of the world: from the incentives to innovate to the incentives to invest, from taxation to regulation, from skills to productivity.

To put it another way, industrial policy was not the cause of the difficulties of Alstom, of AREVA or of Nokia's takeover of Alcatel-Lucent, and even less so of the logistics merger of Norbert Dentressangle and XPO.

It should be recognized that France's industrial policy is sometimes erroneously confused with what some call "industrial engineering". As public companies have historically been the spearhead of industrial policy, policy had the distinctive feature of combining industrial logic with the logic of the economic and political powers, and the two were not always in synch. These inconsistencies could exacerbate the difficulties facing State-owned enterprises.

Industrial policy should content itself with boosting

technological trajectories and promoting business growth. The renovation of industrial policy will involve a comprehensive approach to future technologies. The mechanisms for this will include the development of public-private partnerships and the outsourcing of operations to long-term independent administrative agencies. In this respect the political consensus needs to be extended to include the means for this in order to ensure the continuity of these agencies, so as to stabilize the institutional landscape in which business operates.

Industrial policy is the expression of technological orientations. It can be more or less interventionist and can go beyond more or less simple declarations of intent based on the budgets it is given, depending on overall budgetary constraints. It is especially critical that public funds are committed or private funds are directed so as to finance the demand placed on business. But it is necessary for this public financing to correspond to a genuine request by the State, such as the need for defence equipment to meet foreign policy or the conquest of space, or to a real decision to involve society in its use, such as green energy. Furthermore, in a democracy, the State's request needs to have the support of society, which should be willing to finance, for example, green energy by paying more for carbon and fuel, along the lines of what has been done in Germany.

In this sense, Emmanuel Macron's approach to industrial policy reflects a positive development. Cutting 34 future projects down to fewer than a dozen is relevant, because it helps to clarify the State's commitments and make them more credible. In addition, the digital commitment is the transcription of a technological choice. At the moment "re-industrialization" is focused around the industries of the future, the digitization and modernization of industrial facilities. It would be more honest to dispense with the goal of "re-industrialization" since what is needed is to deal with the economy as a whole

and modernize the means of production in order to make France's productive tissue out of a new stronger fabric.

However, the stated objectives are not based on very risky technological choices and do not commit many resources: a 2.5 billion euro tax benefit for companies investing in their productive facilities over the next 12 months (the accelerated capital cost allowance – "*sur-amortization*" – announced a month ago) and 2.1 billion euros in additional development loans by BPI France for SMEs and ETI over the coming two years. This will thankfully not entail creating another intermediation body for the new policy. As for the role of the State shareholder, the speech was more serene vis-à-vis globalization and more encouraging with regard to European cooperation – as has been shown in the reaction to Nokia's merger process with Alcatel Lucent. The Minister's decisions do not however seem to be departing from a full neutrality, as can be seen in the case of the double voting shares that the State has imposed on Renault.

The overhaul of industrial policy remains modest in terms of resources and goals, but it has the merit of setting objectives for policy that it might actually be able to meet.

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## **The 2013 pension reform: the implicit contribution of pensioners' purchasing power**

By Stéphane Hamayon and Florence Legros

Less than three years after the official retirement age in France was raised in 2010-2011, a new pension reform was passed in early 2014.

This reform is described by its promoters as “sustainable and equitable”. However, only a few months after it passed, if we once again review the mid- and long-term balance of the pension system, we would have to conclude that this subject needs another look ([see our article in the \*Revue de l’OFCE\*, no. 137, 2014](#)). The suspected imbalance stems from a gap between the assumptions that prevailed in 2014 when the reform passed and the actual development of critical macroeconomic variables such as unemployment and productivity growth.

[Our article](#) begins with an analysis of the sensitivity of the overall balance of the pension scheme to economic variables and to the assumptions made. It shows that if the unemployment rate were to stabilize at 7.5% (the lowest rate in 30 years) and not 4.5% as in the scenario adopted by the reform, and productivity grew at a rate of 1%, which is in line with the reasonable estimates made by Caffet Artus (2013), instead of the 1.5% adopted, then this would lead to a continuing deterioration in the pension system accounts (Table 1).

**Table 1. Financing needs of the pension system for private sector employees after the 2013 reform**

Billions of 2012 euros

	2010	2013	2020	2025	2030	2040	2050
<b>Central scenario</b> (productivity 1.5% - unemployment 4.5%)	-9,7	-6,5	-2,0	-1,4	0,8	-1,6	3,2
<b>Low growth scenario</b> (productivity 1.0% - unemployment 7.5%)	-9,7	-6,5	-5,0	-9,3	-20,4	-36,1	-43

Source: Calculs des auteurs.

Another variable that is examined precisely: the growth rate of productivity. Because this has an impact on wages, it plays an important role in rebalancing pension systems when the indexation of pensions and wages recorded in fictitious accounts for pension calculations (*salaires portés au compte*) is based on prices and not on wages. More specifically, high productivity would help balance the accounts, as resources



would grow quickly while employment grow more slowly.

The consequence, however, is a relative impoverishment of pensioners relative to the working population, especially of older retirees for whom de-indexation will have cumulative effects.