

Doesn't real estate capital really contribute to inequality?

By [Guillaume Allègre](#) and [Xavier Timbeau](#)

[In a response to *Capital in the twenty-first century*, Odran Bonnet, Pierre-Henri Bono, Guillaume Chappelle and Etienne Wasmer \(2014\)](#) attempt to show that the book's conclusions regarding an explosion in wealth inequality are "not plausible". The authors point out an inconsistency in Thomas Piketty's thesis: the model of capital accumulation is implicitly a model of the accumulation of productive capital, which is inconsistent with the decision to include real estate capital at its market value in measuring capital. If valued correctly, the ratio of capital to income would have remained stable in France, Britain, the United States and Canada, which contradicts the thesis of Piketty's work.

In [OFCE Briefing Note, no.9/2015 \("Does housing wealth contribute to wealth inequality? A tale of two New York"\)](#), we respond that the authors minimize the contribution of housing to inequality. In particular, we do not believe that trends in real estate prices have "second order effects (actual distributional effects) that are attenuated". As is often the case, the disagreement is due in part to a lack of consensus about what kind of inequality actually matters: inequality in wealth? Income? Consumption? The potentially divergent dynamics of these inequalities? The disagreement is also due to the type of model used. The authors use a dynastic model in which property is passed from parents to children and grandchildren. In this model, changes in real estate prices do not have any real effect. This model is not relevant to accounting for inequalities generated by property in a society where people are mobile and have different life projects from

their parents.

The housing bubble could fuel the development of inequality. Home ownership in the world's metropolises is more and more becoming a closed club for the wealthy, which partitions young people between those with social, educational or financial capital, who can acquire property, and those who can only rent or move to less prosperous areas, with the consequence of further reducing their access to different types of capital. Would it not be better to build enough for everyone to find housing at a price that is in line with the amenities offered? Isn't it apparent that this latter situation is more egalitarian than the former?

For more on this, see: [Allègre, G. and X. Timbeau, 2014 : "Welcome to Nouillorc : Le capital-logement ne contribue-t-il vraiment pas aux inégalités?", Note de l'OFCE, no. 42 of 25 June 2014.](#)

Rental housing: the CAE wants to change the ALUR ...

By Pierre Madec and [Henri Sterdyniak](#)

On October 24th, the French Economic Analysis Council (the CAE) published a paper proposing a new policy on rental housing in France. This paper calls into question a number of government measures in the ALUR bill currently under discussion in Parliament, such as rent control and the universal rent guarantee (the GUL) [\[1\]](#). Are these criticisms justified? The authors acknowledge that the housing market is very specific,

that it requires regulation, and that the state needs to build social housing and assist poor families with housing. Their differences with the policy that the current government intends to follow are thus intrinsically limited, and are more related to means than ends. The free market does not work in the area of housing. There is a need for public intervention that should aim, as we shall see, at contradictory objectives, programmes whose structure is by their very nature subject to discussion.

The existing rental housing stock: co-management and moral hazard

With regard to the private rental market, the authors in essence propose the introduction of a system of housing “flexicurity”, akin to what has been recommended for the labour market: diversification and liberalization of leases, new rights for the landlord, more flexible conditions for terminating a lease, and the development of a system of co-management of the private rental market built around a “housing authority” whose powers would extend from setting “benchmark” rents to managing leases. This “authority”, which would be jointly administered by tenants and landlords, would play a mediating role in conflicts between them, much like the *prud’hommes* bodies for labour disputes. The main argument used by the authors to condemn a scheme such as the GUL universal rent guarantee is that it would create significant problems with moral hazard, that is to say, the guarantee would encourage those covered to take “too many risks”. In this case, tenants, who would have a guarantee that any payment defaults would be covered by the fund, would be less concerned about paying their rent; they could therefore choose housing that is more expensive than what they really need. Owners would also be less concerned in their selection of a tenant. The authors also use the argument of moral hazard to defend the establishment of flexible leases: in their opinion, this would help in the fight against the deterioration of housing

as well as in disputes with neighbours. The idea of tenants who are systematically “voluntary deadbeats” ready to degrade the housing they have leased seems simplistic and over the top. However, this idea is developed at some length by the authors. They seem to forget that the GUL will in particular cover tenants who are unable to pay their rent because of financial hardship (unemployment, divorce, etc.). This guarantee above all offers new protection for the owner – protection funded equally by landlords and tenants through a pooling system. In case of failure to pay rent, the landlord will be reimbursed directly from the fund. The latter will then examine the tenant’s situation and proceed either with a mandatory collection or personalized support if the tenant is genuinely unable to pay. The GUL should allow landlords to rent to people who are in vulnerable situations (workers in precarious jobs, students from low-income families), without the latter needing to come up with deposits. Owners would have less incentive to seek safe tenants (civil servants, students from better-off families, employees of large companies). The State is fully within its role by covering a social risk that has been aggravated by the crisis and growing job insecurity. Isn’t this worth the fantasized risk of an increase in moral hazard? The matter of the lease raises a question of substance. Should encouragement be given to the development of individual landlords, which inevitably generates friction between on the one hand the owner’s concern to freely dispose of their property and be as certain as possible that the rent will be paid and on the other hand the tenant’s concern to enjoy a secure tenure and their demand for the right to housing? A household with a low or irregular income, which is thus more vulnerable, must also be able to find housing in the private sector. It may also seem preferable either to encourage institutional investors to invest in this sector or for households to make greater use of collective investment in housing and set up mechanisms such as the GUL, which can collectively address the issue of non-payment of rent. Housing is far from being an ordinary good. It is, and the authors do

point this out, above all an essential need, a fundamental right. The massive casualization of housing through the establishment of a system of liberalized leases cannot be the solution. On the contrary, authors drawing on the German model, on the introduction of open-ended leases (the standard lease in Germany), constitute a major advance in terms of the tenant's security [2].

Rent control versus the law of the market

With regard to [rent control](#), the authors rely on a number of studies in order to demonstrate the existence of a correlation between the state of degradation of the rental stock and rent control measures. However, the ALUR law contains provisions for taking into account any renovations undertaken. There is of course a continuing risk that the stock will deteriorate, but once this has been spelled out, we should also mention the equally likely result that the [stock could improve](#) precisely due to this provision for taking renovations into account. The authors also develop the idea that control measures will lead to a significant decrease in residential mobility. While this is a real risk for programmes designed to regulate rents during the lease and not upon re-letting (the main cause of the growing inequality in rents observed in France since the 1989 Act), the rent control provisions in the ALUR law are, on the contrary, designed to lead to a convergence in rents [3]. This convergence, although modest, given the large gap still allowed (over 40%), will tend in the direction of greater mobility. In reality, the most important risk raised by the authors is that the number of dwellings available for rent might fall. Although it seems unlikely that landlords already on the market would massively withdraw their rental properties [4], rent control measures could discourage new investors in the rental market because of the resulting decline in yields. This would exacerbate the supply / demand imbalance in high-pressure areas. In practice, this seems unlikely. Even if there were a significant drop in the number of new investors,

those already present on the existing market, given the lease conditions (and contrary to the authors' expectations), cannot easily sell their property, except to a new investor who in light of the fall in yields will demand lower prices. The tax incentive schemes ([Duflot type](#)) currently in force on the market for new housing suggest that landlords who invest will be only slightly affected by rent control. Some investors may nevertheless turn their backs on the construction of new housing, which, in the short term, would tend to push down property prices [\[5\]](#), thus encouraging homeownership and a fall in land prices. The public sector would however have to be ready to take over from private investors. Nearly one in three households in the first income quartile (the poorest 25%) is a tenant in private housing and is subject to a median housing burden, net of housing assistance, of 33%, an increase of nearly 10 percentage points since 1996. Rent control above all offers protection for these low-income households – households that, given the stagnation in social housing and the increasing difficulty in getting on the property ladder, have no choice other than to rent housing in the private sector. As the approach proposed by the [Duflot Act](#) consists of “putting in place a rent control framework to cut down on landlords' predatory behaviour. Not seeking to try to attract investors based on exorbitant rents and expectations of rising real estate prices” does not seem illegitimate if it is actually accompanied by an effort in favour of social housing. Pressure on the housing market (where supply and demand are rigid) has permitted high rent increases, which is leading to unjustified transfers between landlords and tenants. These transfers hurt the purchasing power of the poorest, the consumer price index, competitiveness, and more. Conversely, these increases can stimulate the construction of new housing by pushing up the value of property, but this effect is low and slow (given the constraints on land). Rent control can help put a stop to rent increases, even if it undermines incentives for private investment in housing to some extent. It cannot be excluded *a priori*.

Social housing mistreated

Even though the authors' observations seem fair – social housing does not play its full role, and the systems of construction and allocation are complex and inefficient – the solutions that they propose are less so, and are not very consistent. The debate on the role and place of social housing in France is old. Should it be reserved for poor households, thus abandoning the goal of social diversity? If this is done, should the eligibility ceilings be reduced, even though today more than 60% of the population might be entitled to social housing? Should social housing be profitable? Is there a sufficient supply of it? The idea put forward by the authors, according to which the State, through subsidized loans to housing agencies (HLMs), is to take care of housing only the poorest households, and must leave housing for the working and middle classes to competition (promoters and private investors), is open to criticism, especially in these times of economic crisis. What is needed, on the contrary, is to increase the share of social housing as well as intermediate housing at “moderate” rents that is built with public funds to house the lower classes at reasonable rents and reduce tensions in critical areas. The authors' idea that social housing is not a right to be granted *ad vitam aeternam* seems justified. In 2006, according to the INSEE, more than one out of ten tenants in social housing belonged to the fifth quintile (the richest 20%). Unless one believes that social housing should, in accordance with the principle of social diversity, be open to all, then it is necessary to strengthen measures to encourage these households to leave social housing and direct them to the private sector, or accession needs to be tightened, as the additional rental charges currently applied are not effective enough. But the age of the occupants has to be taken into account, along with the availability of nearby housing at market rents. For housing the lower and middle classes (that is to say, “profitable” operations), the authors also suggest developing competition between private

agents (developers, private builders, etc.). Once the amortization period of the loan from the Caisse des Depots et Consignations (CDC) expires, the housing thus built could change status and either switch into the private sector or be sold. This idea gives the impression that the shortage of social housing is the consequence of a lack of available funds. However, thanks to the amounts deposited in Livret A savings accounts, there is no lack of money. The brakes on housing construction are to be found elsewhere (lack of political will, [lack of land](#), etc.). Even though it is necessary to fight against urban segregation and the way to do this is by “disseminating poor households throughout the urban fabric”, the proposals of the authors of the CAE note are not realistic. The index of spatial segregation proposed (see Box 10 in the [working paper](#)) would lead to no longer building social housing in areas where it is already significantly concentrated. However, given the land constraints in high-pressure areas, this is not feasible. The objective of the fight against segregation should not take priority over the goal of construction but complement it. Public funding that is rigidly conditioned on the value of one or two indicators, even the most transparent ones, as proposed by the authors, would be extremely complex to implement. The SRU law establishing identical goals for communes with very different characteristics needs to be amended. Social housing needs to be built in accordance with need and demand. Currently, however, there is no match between supply and demand even in the less problematic areas (housing too big or too small, too old, etc.). According to the INSEE, 14% of social housing tenants are thus in a situation of over-occupation (twice the proportion seen in the private sector). Not only is entry into social housing difficult, but so is mobility within the sector. It is thus necessary to build social housing massively not only to accommodate new populations but also to house current social housing tenants in better conditions. Should the housing issue be de-municipalized? It is certainly a

mistake to leave urban decision-making (and action) up to the municipalities alone, as some may be encouraged to give preference to selling off the available land to private developers rather than to housing agencies, whether this is directly for financial reasons or in an effort to attract a relatively affluent population without social problems. Housing policy thus requires strong incentives for the construction of social housing, including aid specifically for the municipalities where it is located, along with legal constraints and compensatory taxation targeted specifically at towns that have no social housing. The SRU Law is necessary. Note that proposals along these lines are difficult to get adopted at the political level. Thus, the measure to provide for inter-communal decision-making power regarding in particular the Local Urbanism Plan (PLU), a provision in the ALUR law, was largely rejected by the Senate, with the support of the Minister of Housing [6]. Similarly, the Union sociale pour l'habitat (social housing union), while deploring the lack of social mobility in the sector, regularly opposes any significant changes to the allocation process that could lead to greater mobility, with each organization striving to protect its own criteria.

Rent and housing aid between taxation and imputation

In the CAE note, the way the tax system takes account of housing costs is the subject of questionable proposals. We agree of course with the starting point: it would be desirable to achieve a certain tax neutrality between income from financial capital and implicit rents. This is necessary from the point of view of both economic efficiency (not to overly encourage investment in housing) and social justice (given equal taxable income, a landlord and tenant do not have the same standard of living). But we believe this can be done effectively only by taxing implicit rents. It is difficult to undertake such a reform today, when substantial tax increases have already occurred. It would be difficult to introduce a

new tax. This would therefore have to be accompanied by an upward translation of the tax brackets, so that, if owners pay more, tenants pay less. This could, furthermore, divert some households from building housing; the proceeds would be used in part for the construction of housing, which is inconsistent with the previous proposal to use these to reduce tenants' taxes. This would thus have to be introduced only very gradually. First the property tax bases would be re-valued. Then this database (from which landlords accessing it could deduct borrowing costs) could be used to tax the rental values at the CSG (wealth tax) or IR (income tax) rates (with some deduction). Fearing that this measure would be unpopular, the authors suggest that tenants could deduct their rent from their taxable income (with a relatively high ceiling of around 1000 euros per month). This proposal is not acceptable: – it is arbitrary: why not also deduct, still with ceilings, spending on food (no-one can live without eating) or on clothing, transportation or mobile phones (now indispensable). This could go on forever. The IR tax scales already take into account the need for a minimum income level (for a couple with two children, taxation only kicks in above a wage income of 2200 euros per month). The authors' measure would privilege housing costs over other spending, with little justification; – the tax savings achieved in this way would be zero for non-taxable persons, and low for those near the taxation threshold: a family with two children and an income of 3000 euros per month with 600 euros in rent would pay 700 euros less tax; a wealthy family taxed at the marginal rate of 45% could save 5400 euros in tax, or 450 euros per month, that is to say, more than the housing benefit of most poor families; – the measure would be very costly. The authors do not give us a precise estimate, but lowering the taxable income of 40% of the 18 million taxable households in France (the proportion of tenants) by 10,000 euros could reduce IR tax revenue by 14 billion. In fact, this must necessarily be offset by a downward translation of the tax brackets. At the end, here, too, if the tenants pay less, the landlords pay more.

Furthermore, the measure would be less effective economically than the taxation of implicit rents, since it would introduce a bias in favour of housing costs and does not take into account the value of the property occupied. The authors propose integrating the housing allowance into the IR tax and having all this managed by the tax administration, which would be responsible for developing a coherent redistributive policy on behalf of people on low incomes. While the current system of housing assistance [can of course be improved](#), once again the authors' analysis is one-sided, and does not include all the aid given to the poorest (the "RSA socle" – basic income supplement for the unemployed; the "RSA activité" – income supplement for the working poor; and the "PPE" – in-work negative income tax). They forget that helping low-income people requires personalized support, in real time, on a monthly or quarterly basis, which the tax administration is unable to provide. In fact, they wind up with a system that is hardly simplified: the tax authorities would determine housing assistance for non-taxed households that the CAF Family Allowance fund would pay monthly and which would be adjusted by the tax administration the following year. But it is left unsaid whether the same formula would apply to the RSA income supplement. For taxable persons, the assistance would be managed by the tax authorities. The authors tell us that, "the aid could not be less than the current housing allowance", but their proposal would greatly increase the number of untaxed households for whom it would be necessary to compare the tax savings and the allowance using the old formula. This is not manageable. It would of course be desirable to simplify the calculation of the housing allowance and to better integrate it with the RSA income supplement. This should be included in a reform of the RSA that the government needs to undertake (see the Sirugue report and the criticism of it by [Guillaume Allègre](#)), but the overall arrangement must continue to be managed by those who know how to do this, the CAF family fund, and not the tax authorities.

Readers interested in housing-related issues should see the [Revue de l'OFCE "Ville & Logement", no. 128, 2013.](#)

[\[1\] Trannoy A. and E. Wasmer, « La politique du logement locatif », Note du CAE, n°10, October 2013](#) and the [document de travail associé](#) [both in French].

[\[2\]](#) Note that the German market is very different from the French market (majority of renters, little demographic pressure, etc.), and that its rules cannot therefore be transposed.

[\[3\]](#) Currently, in the Paris region and more generally in all the so-called high-pressure neighbourhoods, the difference in rent between those who moved during the year and tenants who have been in their homes over 10 years exceeds 30% (38% for Paris) (OLAP, 2013).

[\[4\]](#) Indeed, “old” investors potentially have higher rates of return than do “new” investors.

[\[5\]](#) As the number of new households is tending to fall (Jacquot, 2012, “La demande potentielle de logements à l’horizon 2030”, *Observation et statistiques*, N°135, Commissariat au Développement Durable).

[\[6\]](#) An amendment according a low level for a blocking minority to France’s “communes” during changes to the PLU (25% of communes and 10% of the population) was adopted by the Senate on Friday, 25 October – an amendment thereby reducing in practice inter-communal authority in this area.

Rent control: will the ALUR law be sufficient?

By Sabine Le Bayon, Pierre Madec and Christine Rifflart

On 10 September 2013, Parliament began discussing the [bill on “Access to housing and urban renovation \[“Accès au Logement et un Urbanisme Rénové” – ALUR\]](#). This legislation will result in stepped-up state intervention in the private rental market and complements the government decree that took effect in summer 2012 on rent control in high-pressure areas. This was an initial step in the government’s effort to curb the increase in housing costs being faced by renters. [1]

The government’s willingness to regulate the excesses of the private rental market is expected to have a rapid impact on households moving into a new home. For sitting tenants, the process is likely to take longer. In a city like Paris, we can expect that, if the highest rents decline to the ceiling set by law, average rents will fall by 4 to 6%. If through a ripple effect this then affects all rents, the deflationary impact would be greater. On the other hand, the risk of an upward drift for lower rents cannot be discarded, even if the government argues otherwise. Ultimately, the impact of the law will depend in large part on the zoning defined by the rent monitoring “observatories” that are currently being set up.

The regulatory decree: a visible, but minimal, impact

The latest [annual report](#) of the rent observatory for the Paris region [the Observatoire des loyers de l’agglomération parisienne – “OLAP”] [2] sheds some initial light on the decree’s impact on rent control. To recap, the decree holds rents upon re-letting to a maximum of the pace of the legal benchmark (the “IRL”), unless substantial work has been performed (in which case, the increase is unrestricted).

Between 1 January 2012 and 1 January 2013, 51% of Paris residences offered for re-letting saw their rent increase faster than the IRL, despite the absence of substantial work. This share was lower than in 2011 (58.3%) and 2010 (59.4%), but remains close to the level observed between 2005 and 2009 (50%), prior to the existence of the decree.

The impact derived from monthly data seems a bit more conclusive. Thus, over the period from August to December 2012 when the decree was implemented, the share of rentals offered for re-letting that rose faster than the IRL cap fell by 25% on average over a year, against only 8% for the months from January to July 2012 compared to the same period in 2011.

The decree therefore does seem to have had an effect, by helping to reduce the share of rents that increased faster than the IRL cap by about 18%. However, given that if there had been full compliance with the decree no rentals would have risen more than the IRL, the impact has still been inadequate. Several factors already identified in a [working document](#) may explain this: the non-existence of benchmark rents, a lack of information about both owners and tenants, a lack of recourse, etc. One year on, it would seem that these shortcomings had a negative impact on the measure's implementation.

A law on a larger scale

The major innovation of the ALUR law concerns the regulation of the *level* of rent in high-pressure areas, whereas previous decrees focused on *changes* in rents. Henceforth, a range of permissible rent levels will be set by law, and the decree will then regulate the maximum permitted changes [3]. To do this, every year the government sets by a prefectural decree a median benchmark rent per sq.m, per geographic area (neighbourhood, district, etc.) and per type of accommodation (one-bedroom flat, two-bedroom, etc.). So:

– For new lets or re-lettings, the rent cannot exceed the cap

of 20% over the median benchmark rent, called the upwards adjusted median benchmark rent, except by documenting an exceptional additional rent (for special services, etc.). After that, any increase may not exceed the IRL, in accordance with the regulatory decree for high-pressure areas (except if there is major work);

– Upon renewal of the lease, the rent may be adjusted upwards or downwards depending on the upwards adjusted or downwards adjusted median benchmark rent [4]. Thus, a tenant (or a lessor) may bring an action to decrease (or respectively, to increase) the rent if the latter is higher (or lower) than the median rent as adjusted upwards (or downwards). In case of an increase in the rent, a mechanism for staggering this increase over time is set up. If there is a disagreement between tenant and landlord, an amicable settlement process may be initiated prior to referral to a judge within a strictly determined timeframe. Within this range, the increase is limited to the IRL;

– During a lease, the annual rent review is currently performed as now, on the basis of the IRL;

– Furnished rentals will now be covered by rent control: the prefect will set a higher benchmark rate and any change will be limited to the IRL.

The introduction of these median benchmark rents represents three major advances. On the one hand, they will be calculated from the information gathered by the rental observatories about the entire rental housing stock, and not simply from vacant housing available for rental, *i.e.* what is called the “market” rent. This so-called market rent is almost 10% above the average of all rents, which itself is above the median rent. This calculation method will therefore inevitably lead to lower rents (both market and average).

Similarly, choosing the median rather than the average as the

benchmark rent should make for greater stability in the measure. In the event that all rents more than 20% above the median (*i.e.* above the upwards adjusted benchmark rent) are reduced and all other rents remain unchanged, the median remains the same. In the case of an adjustment of all rents, the median would fall, but in a lesser proportion than the average, which by definition is more sensitive to changes in extreme values.

Finally, the obligation to include in the lease both the median rent and the upwards adjusted median benchmark rent, the last rent charged and, where relevant, the amount and nature of any work performed since the last contract was signed, provides for greater transparency and a stricter regulatory framework, which should result in greater compliance with the measure.

What changes should be expected?

In 2012, out of the 390,000 residences put up for rent in Paris, 94,000 have a rent higher than the upwards adjusted median rent (3.7 euros / sq.m more on average) and 32,000 have a rent that is more than 30% below the median benchmark rent (2.4 euros / sq.m less on average). Since only rents above the upwards adjusted median rent are to be corrected, the reduction in the average rent would be 4% to 6%, depending on the area and type of housing. This reduction, although not insignificant, would at best permit a return to the rent levels recorded in 2010, before the steep inflation seen in 2011 and 2012 (+7.5% between 2010 and 2012). This adjustment in rents could nevertheless take time. Owners and tenants could easily exercise their rights at the time of a re-letting [5], but revaluations at the time of a lease renewal may take longer to realize. Despite access to information and a regulatory environment that is more favourable to the tenant, the risk of a conflict with the landlord and heightened competition in the rental market in areas where the law applies may still deter some tenants from asserting their

rights.

The issue is much more complex for the 32,000 residences with rents below the downwards adjusted benchmark rent. While the quality of some of this housing can justify the difference (insalubrious, location, etc.), it is also clear that the main factor behind the weakness of some rents is the tendency of tenants to be sedentary. Thus, according to the OLAP rent observatory in Paris, the average rent for housing occupied for over 10 years by the same tenant is 20% lower than the average rent for all lets. The question thus arises of revaluing these rents. Indeed, during a new let or a lease renewal the law allows owners to reassess up to the level of the downwards adjusted median rent – which is also in contradiction with the decree [6]. Once this level has been reached, future changes shall not exceed the IRL.

Eventually, then, some units with similar characteristics will therefore be on the market at very disparate rents, thus penalizing landlords with sedentary tenants. In contrast, tenants who have lived in their homes for a long time might well see significant revaluations in their rent (over 10%). The housing cost burden [7] on these households could thus rise, pushing those facing excessive budget constraints to migrate to areas experiencing less pressure.

Nevertheless, the possibility of revaluing the rent to the level of the market rent in case of an obvious undervaluation is already provided under existing law, *i.e.* the Act of 6 July 1989 (Article 17c), at the time the lease is renewed. In 2012, in Paris, 3.2% of owners made use of this article. With the new law, while readjustments should be more numerous, the inflationary impact should be weaker as the benchmark (the downwards adjusted median rent) is well below the market rent.

From this point on the issue of zoning is central: the more refined the breakdown, the more the benchmark rents will correspond to the actual characteristics of the local market.

In the event of a larger division of the territory, the median benchmark rents may be too high for the less expensive neighbourhoods and too low for the more expensive ones. Meanwhile, low rents will not be re-valued much in the expensive neighbourhoods, and even less so in the others. This could lead to more “inter-neighbourhood” convergence in rents – regardless of local conditions – and less “within-neighbourhood” convergence, which would have adverse consequences for both landlord and tenant.

The impact on rents of the law currently under discussion could be all the greater given that property prices began to fall in France in 2012 and the current sluggish economy is already slowing rent hikes. But it should not be forgotten that only the construction of housing in high-pressure areas (including via densification [8]) will solve the structural problems of the market. Rent control measures are merely a temporary measure to limit the increase in the housing cost burden, but they are not by themselves sufficient.

[1] For more information, see the blog [“Rent control: what is the expected impact?”](#)

[2] The territory covered by this report is composed of Paris and what are called the “petite couronne” and the “grande couronne” (its near and far suburbs).

[3] As the rent control decree does not cover the same field as the law (38 urban areas versus 28), some areas will be subject to the control only of changes, and not of levels.

[4] While the bill is unclear on the calculation of the downwards adjusted benchmark rent, an amendment adopted in July by the Commission of the Assembly proposed that this should be at least 30% lower than the median benchmark rent. Another amendment clarifies that in case of an upward adjustment, the new rent shall not exceed the downwards

adjusted median rent.

[5] In 2012, only 18% of residences on the private rental market were subject to re-letting.

[6] During the renewal of a lease or a re-letting, the rent control decree permits the owner to re-value their rent by half the gap between the last rent and the market rent.

[7] This is the share of household income spent on housing.

[8] On this subject, see the article by [Xavier Timbeau](#), "[Comment construire \(au moins\) un million de logements en région parisienne](#)" [How to build (at least) one million residences in the Paris region"], *Revue de l'OFCE* no. 128.

Roofs or ceilings?

by [Philippe Weil](#)

The [bill to promote access to housing and urban renovation](#) provides for regulating rents "mainly in urban areas where there is a strong imbalance between housing supply and demand and where rents have experienced the steepest increase in recent years". Rents that exceed the median rent, set by neighbourhood and housing type, by more than 20% "will be targeted for a reduction". The purpose of the cap is of course laudable, as it is "designed to combat the housing crisis, which for many years has been characterized by a sharp increase in prices, housing shortages and a decline in consumer purchasing power". The road to hell is, alas, paved with good intentions, as today's ceilings often destroy tomorrow's roofs :

- “Rent ceilings [...] cause haphazard and arbitrary allocation of space, inefficient use of space, retardation of new construction and indefinite continuance of rent ceilings, or subsidization of new construction and a future depression in residential building. Formal rationing by public authority would probably make matters still worse.”

Opposing rent ceilings does not mean, however, resolving the inequalities that arise with respect to housing:

- “The fact that, under free market conditions, better quarters go to those who have larger incomes or more wealth is, if anything, simply a reason for taking long-term measures to reduce the inequality of income and wealth. For those, like us, who would like even more equality than there is at present, not alone for housing but for all products, it is surely better to attack directly existing inequalities in income and wealth at their source than to ration each of the hundreds of commodities and services that compose our standard of living. It is the height of folly to permit individuals to receive unequal money incomes and then to take elaborate and costly measures to prevent them from using their incomes.”

The authors of these two quotes, which enjoin us to allow the free market system to allocate the available housing to tenants and which advocate attacking inequality of income and wealth directly at the source, are none other than Milton Friedman and George Stigler – the two founders of the Chicago School. The title of this post is borrowed – I hope they forgive me – from their 1946 article [“Roofs or Ceilings: the Current Housing Problem”](#) [1].

The Duflot bill envisages a rent control mechanism that is far more sophisticated than the one denounced by Friedman and Stigler nearly seventy years ago. Its impact on the French

real estate market can of course be evaluated in a few years, but the recent economic literature warns that so-called “second generation” rent control mechanisms often have ambiguous effects [\[2\]](#) – not always negative but not necessarily positive [\[3\]](#). In these circumstances, it is regrettable that a preliminary experiment of the sort that prudence demands is not being considered for some randomly selected cities. While political urgency undoubtedly argues against delay, nevertheless in economics as in medicine it is crucial to ensure that efforts to cure the patient do not wind up killing him.

To conclude, the warning of Friedman and Stigler still holds: inequalities in income and wealth need to be attacked directly at the source, and not later down the line.

[\[1\]](#) Foundation for Economic Education, Irvington-on-Hudson, NY.

[\[2\]](#) Cf., for example, *The Economics and Law of Rent Control*, by Kaushik Basu and Patrick Emerson, World Bank, 1998.

[\[3\]](#) Please see [Le Bayon, Madec and Rifflart \(2013\)](#) [in French] for an evaluation of the regulation of the French rental market.

Housing and the city: the new challenges

By Sabine Le Bayon, [Sandrine Levasseur](#) and Christine Rifflart

The residential real estate market is a market like no other.

Since access to housing is a right and since inequalities in housing are increasing, the role of government is crucial to better regulate how the market functions. France has a large stock of social housing. Should it be expanded further? Should it have a regulatory role in the overall functioning of the housing market? Should our neighbours' systems of social housing, in particular the Dutch and British systems, be taken as models? On the private market, the higher prices of home purchases and rentals illustrate the lack of housing supply in the country's most attractive areas. At the individual level, the residential market is becoming less fluid: moving is difficult due to problems finding housing suited to career and family needs. It is therefore necessary to develop appropriate policies to enhance residential mobility and reduce imbalances by stimulating the supply of new housing.

Housing is also an integral part of our landscape, both urban and rural. It distinguishes our cities of today and of tomorrow. The commitments made in the framework of the Grenelle environmental consultation process demand a real revolution in land use as well as in technical standards for construction. To ensure more housing, should undeveloped land be used or should developed land be exploited more intensely? How should a housing stock that has become obsolete in terms of energy standards be renovated, and how should this be financed?

These are the challenges addressed by the contributions collected in the new book [Ville et Logement](#) in the *Débats et politiques* series of the *Revue de l'OFCE*, edited by Sabine Le Bayon, Sandrine Levasseur and Christine Rifflart. With authors from a variety of disciplines (economics, sociology, political science, urban planning) and backgrounds (researchers as well as institutional players), this review aims to improve our understanding of the issues related to housing and the city.