

The Greek Sisyphus and its public debt: towards an end to the ordeal?

By [Céline Antonin](#)

After its failure to elect a new President by a qualified majority vote, the Greek Parliament was dissolved, with early elections to be held on 25 January 2015. The radical left party Syriza is leading the opinion polls on the election, ahead of the “New Democracy” party of the outgoing Prime Minister, Anthony Samaras. While Syriza’s economic programme has met with enthusiasm from the population, it has aroused concern from the Troika of creditors (IMF, ECB and EU), particularly on three issues: the country’s potential withdrawal from the euro zone, the implementation of a fiscal stimulus, and a partial sovereign default. This last topic will be the main issue after the elections.

The election’s real stakes: restructuring Greece’s public debt

Fears about Greece’s potential exit from the euro zone (the infamous “Grexit”) need to be nuanced. The situation is different from what it was at the time of the sovereign debt crisis, when bond rate differentials were fuelling worry about contagion and the breakup of the euro zone. Furthermore, Syriza is not in favour of leaving the euro, and no-one can force the country’s hand, given that there is no provision for this in any text. Finally, the consequences of such a decision on the other members could be severe, so that a Greek withdrawal from the euro zone would come only as a last resort.

Syriza is calling for an end to austerity and for a fiscal stimulus of 11 billion euros along with restoring the minimum wage to its previous level, better pensions, rehiring civil

servants and increased public spending. Can a compromise be reached with the Troika? Nothing is less sure, and it is virtually certain that Syriza will have to revise its ambitions downwards. The Greek deficit has of course shrunk. The country ran a small primary surplus in 2014 and is expected to continue its fiscal consolidation policy in 2015-2016. But Greece must continue to borrow to finance the interest on the debt, to repay or renew the debt reaching maturity and to repay the loans from the IMF. To do this, Greece must rely largely on external aid. From the second half of 2015, the country will face a financing gap of 12.5 billion euros (19.6 billion euros if it does not get IMF assistance). Moreover, Greece's still fragile banks^[1] are very dependent on access to the ECB's Emergency Liquidity Assistance Program (ELA), which allows them to obtain emergency liquidity from the Bank of Greece. If Greece rejects the reforms, a showdown with the Troika is likely. The ECB has already threatened to cut off the country's access to liquidity. In addition, the Troika is the main creditor of Greece, which however has a new bargaining point: to the extent that Greece borrows only what it needs to repay its debt, and not to fund its budget deficit, it could threaten its creditors with a unilateral default on payments, even if this is a dangerous game that could deprive it of access to market financing for many years to come.

It is precisely this issue of restructuring Greece's debt and a partial default that is being emphasized by Syriza and which will likely be one of the main post-election issues. Alexis Tsipras wants to cancel a portion of the public debt, to put a moratorium on interest payments, and to condition repayments on the country's economic performance. According to forecasts by the EU Commission and the IMF, Greece's public debt ratio is expected to fall from 175% of GDP in 2013 to 128% in 2020. However, the assumptions underlying this scenario are not realistic, *i.e.* nominal growth of more than 3% in 2015, a primary surplus of 4.5% of GDP between 2016 and 2019, etc.

Given the size of Greece's public debt in 2013 and its amortization profile (with reimbursements amounting to 13 billion euros in 2019 and up to 18 billion euros in 2039 [2]), a new restructuring seems inevitable.

A public debt that is essentially held by euro zone countries

Since the onset of the Greek crisis in autumn 2009, the composition of the country's public debt has changed substantially. While in 2010, the debt was held by financial investors, the picture in early 2015 is very different [3]. After two assistance plans (in 2010 and 2012) and a restructuring of the public debt held by the private sector in March 2012 (Private Sector Involvement Plan), 75% of the public debt now consists of loans (Table 1). Together the IMF, the ECB, the national central banks and the countries of the Eurozone hold 80% of Greece's public debt.

Table 1. Breakdown of Greece's public debt, by holder, september 2014

In billion euros		
	September 2014	As % of total debt
Total	321,7	100
Debt securities	79,8	25
Commercial paper (Short-term)	13,4	4
Treasury bills (Long-term)	66,4	21
<i>By ECB and national central banks</i>	25,0	8
<i>By private sector</i>	41,4	13
Loans	241,8	75
IMF	32,1	10
Greek central bank + domestic loans	4,4	1
Euro zone countries	194,8	61
<i>From 1st assistance plan (Greek Loan Facility)</i>	52,9	16
<i>From 2nd assistance plan (EFSF)</i>	141,9	44
Other loans and repos	10,5	3

Sources: Debt Management Agency, IMF, ECFIN, author's calculations.

Conversely, since the March 2012 restructuring plan, Europe's banks have sharply reduced their exposure to Greece's public debt (Table 2). Moreover, their capital levels have risen since 2010, especially with the gradual implementation of the Basel 3 reform. The banks thus have a safety margin in the case of a partial default by Greece.

Table 2. Exposure of banks to Greek debt (public and total)

In billions of euros

	Total Greek debt (public + private)			Greek public debt		
	Q3 2009	Q1 2012	Q2 2014	Q4 2010	Q1 2012	Q2 2014
Total banks	430,5	105,6	73,8	62,9	9,0	3,5
European banks	389,2	99,1	47,8	60,2	8,3	2,2
<i>France</i>	112,4	54,7	3,0	20,3	2,5	0,1
<i>Germany</i>	61,8	8,3	18,9	20,0	1,0	0,2
<i>United Kingdom</i>	17,9	11,1	18,1	4,6	0,3	0,8
Non-European banks	NA	6,5	26,1	2,6	0,7	1,3
<i>United States</i>	27,8	5,1	24,6	2,0	0,6	1,3

Sources: BIS, ECB, author's calculations.

Since more than half of Greece's public debt is held by members of the euro zone, no renegotiations can take place without their involvement.

So what are the possibilities for restructuring the debt?

The European countries have already made several concessions to help Greece service its debt:

- The maturity of the loans has been increased and the interest rate on loans granted by the EFSF has been reduced. For the first assistance program (bilateral loans), the initial maturity was 2026 (with a grace period until 2019) and the interest rate was indexed to the 3-month Euribor plus a risk premium of 300 basis points. In 2012, this risk premium was cut to 50 basis points and the maturity was extended by 15 years to 2041;
- Any profits made by the ECB and the national central banks on the bonds they hold were returned to Greece;
- Interest payments on the EFSF loans were deferred by 10 years.

Solutions like some used in the past could be implemented. The debt could be rescheduled. Indeed, the rate charged on the loans in the first assistance package (3-month Euribor + 50 basis points) is generally higher than the financing costs of

the European countries, and could be lowered. And the term of the loans in the first and second assistance packages could be extended by another 10 years, until 2051. According to the Bruegel think-tank, these two measures combined [would reduce Greece's total repayments by 31.7 billion euros](#).

These measures nevertheless seem limited for resolving the issue of Greek debt: they only postpone the problem. Other measures are needed to relieve Greece of its public debt burden. As the euro zone countries are the main ones exposed to Greece's debt, they have an interest in finding a compromise: if there is a unilateral default, it is taxpayers throughout Europe who will wind up paying.

As for the IMF, there's no point waiting for debt forgiveness. The institution is indeed the senior creditor in case of a country's default, and lender of last resort. Since its founding, it has never cancelled a debt. It is therefore with the members of the euro zone, Greece's main creditors, that a partial default needs to be negotiated. On the one hand, Greece can threaten an uncoordinated unilateral default, causing losses for its creditors. But on the other, it has no interest in alienating euro zone members and the ECB, which have been its main supporters during the crisis. A sudden default would deprive it of access to market financing for many years; even if Greece has achieved a primary surplus, the situation is unstable and it still needs external financing, even if only to honour its repayments to the IMF. One solution would be for the euro zone countries to accept a discount on the face value of the government debt they hold, as was done with private investors in March 2012.

In conclusion, Greece is facing a series of challenges. In the short term, the priority is to find sources of financing to get through 2015. To do this, the country will have to deal with the Troika, in particular the ECB, whose action will be crucial. The Bank has warned Greece that if negotiations fail, it could cut off the country's access to liquidity.

Furthermore, on 22 January 2015, the ECB must reach its long-awaited decision on quantitative easing; the issue is whether the ECB will accept the redemption of Greek government bonds. In the longer term, the issue of restructuring the debt will inevitably arise, regardless of who wins the polls. However, the restructuring is likely to be easier with public creditors than with the private banks, if, that is, Greece has in turn won the trust of its European partners.

[1] See the [results of the stress tests published by the ECB on 26 October 2014](#).

[2] See the [Hellenic Republic Public Debt Bulletin, no. 75, September 2014, Table 6](#).

[3] For a comparison with the situation in June 2012, see [Céline Antonin, "Retour à la drachme: un drame insurmontable?", \[Return to the drachma: an insurmountable drama?\], Note de l'OFCE no. 20, June 2012](#).

France – the sick man of Europe?

by [Mathieu Plane](#) – Economist at OFCE (French Economic Observatory – Sciences Po)

The year 2014 was marked for France by the risk of European Commission sanctions for the failure of its budget to comply

with Treaties; by the downgrade by Fitch of French government debt (following the one by S&P a year earlier); by the absence of any sign of a in the unemployment rate; by a rising deficit after four years of consecutive decline; and by the distinction of being the only country in Europe to run a significant current account deficit: economically, it seemed like the country's worst year since the beginning of the crisis, in 2008. France did not of course go through the kind of recession it did in 2009, when the Eurozone experienced a record fall in GDP (-4.5% and -2.9% for the EMU and for France respectively). But for the first time since the subprime bubble burst, in 2014 French GDP grew more slowly (0.4%) than eurozone average (0.8%). The country's weakening position is fuelling the view that France may be the new sick man of Europe, a victim of its leaders' lax fiscal approach and its inability to reform. Is this really the case?

It is worth noting first that the French economic and social model proved its effectiveness during the crisis. Thanks to its system of social safety nets, to a combined (consumers, business, government) debt level that is lower than the Eurozone average, while the household savings rate that is higher, to a low level of inequality, and to a relatively solid banking system, France weathered the crisis better than most of its European partners. Indeed, between early 2008 and late 2013, French GDP grew by 1.1%, while during that same period the Eurozone as a whole contracted by 2.6%; France also avoided the recession in 2012 and 2013 that most Eurozone countries experienced. Looking at Europe for the six years from 2008 to 2013, France's economic performance was relatively close to that of Germany (2.7%), better than that of the UK (-1.3%) and well ahead of Spain (-7.2%) and Italy (-8.9%). Similarly, during this period investment in France contracted less than in the Eurozone as a whole (-7.7% versus -17%), and unemployment increased less (+3 points versus +4.6). Finally, the French economy's ability to stand up better to the crisis was not linked with a greater increase in

public debt compared to the Eurozone average (+28 GDP points for both France and the Eurozone) or even the United Kingdom (+43 points).

Nevertheless, [France has seen its position in the Eurozone deteriorate in 2014. This was marked not only by lower growth than its partners](#), but also by higher unemployment (the Eurozone rate has gradually fallen), an increase in public debt (which virtually stabilized in the Eurozone), a decline in investment (which improved slightly in the euro zone), an increase in its public deficit (while that of the Eurozone fell) and a substantial current account deficit (the euro zone is running a significant surplus). Why this divergence?

While France does have a problem with competitiveness, note that [almost half of its current account deficit is cyclical](#) due to more dynamic imports than its major trading partners, which generally have worse output gaps. Furthermore, until 2013, the country's fiscal adjustment [was focused more on the tax burden than on public spending](#). Conversely, the focus in 2014 was more on public spending. [Given France's position in the business cycle and its budget decisions](#), the fiscal multiplier in 2014 was higher than in previous years, so that fiscal consolidation imposed a heavy toll in terms of growth. In terms of competitiveness, French industry is caught in the middle of the Eurozone between, on the one hand, peripheral countries of the euro area, including Spain, which have entered into a spiral of wage deflation fuelled by mass unemployment, and the core countries, especially Germany, which are reluctant to give up their excessive trade surpluses through higher domestic demand and more inflation. [Faced with the generalization of wage devaluations in the Eurozone](#), France had no choice but to respond with a policy to improve the competitiveness of its businesses by cutting labour costs. Thus, the CICE tax credit and the Pact of Responsibility represent a total transfer of 41 billion euros to the firm system, mainly financed by households. While the positive

impact of these transfers will be felt over the medium-to-long term, [the financing effort together with the country's fiscal consolidation effort had an immediate adverse effect on purchasing power](#), which goes a long way in explaining the poor growth performance of 2014. Finally, 2014 also saw a steep fall in housing investment (-7%), the largest drop since the real estate crisis of the early 1990s (excluding 2009).

There are several reasons why France's poor performance is not likely to be repeated in 2015: first, in order to halt the decline in construction, [emergency measures were taken in August 2014 to free up housing investment](#), with the first effects to be felt in 2015. Second, the programmes enacted to improve business competitiveness will begin to take full effect from 2015: the CICE tax credit and the Responsibility Pact will slash business costs by 17 billion euros in 2015, up significantly from only 6.5 billion in 2014. Third, the slowdown in the fiscal consolidation programmes of our commercial partners and the introduction of a minimum wage in Germany will both help French exports. In addition, [the lower exchange rate for the euro](#) and falling oil prices are powerful levers for boosting the French economy in 2015, and together could amount to one extra point of growth. Given the ECB's policy on quantitative easing, interest rates should also remain low for at several more quarters. Finally, although timid, the Juncker plan along with marginal changes in Europe's fiscal rules will favour a pickup in investment. These factors will put some wind in the sails of French growth by helping to offset the negative impact of the reduction in public spending for 2015, so that the economy finally reaches a pace that will be sufficient to begin to reverse the unemployment curve and reduce the public deficit.

While France is not the sick man of Europe, [it is nevertheless still very much dependent, like all euro zone countries, on Europe having strong macroeconomic levers](#). Up to now, these have had a negative impact on business, be it through overly

restrictive fiscal policies or a monetary policy that has proved insufficiently expansionary in the light of other central banks' action. In an integrated currency zone, deflation cannot be fought on a national basis. The choice of a European policy mix that is more geared towards growth and inflation is a first since the start of the sovereign debt crisis. Boosted by lower oil prices, let us hope that these levers will prove strong enough to halt the depressive spiral that the Eurozone has been going through since the onset of the crisis. The recovery will be European, before being French, or there won't be one.

Rotation of voting on the ECB Governing Council: more than symbolic?

By [Sandrine Levasseur](#)

[Lithuania's adoption of the euro](#) on 1 January brought the number of euro zone members to nineteen, the threshold at which the voting system in the European Central Bank (ECB) Governing Council has to be changed. While this change took place almost unnoticed in France, things were different in Germany and Ireland, where the introduction of the system of rotation in the voting that decides the euro zone's monetary policy has raised concern and even opposition. Is this reaction justified? Here we propose some food for thought and reflection.

1) How will the system of rotation function?

Until now, at the monthly meetings of the ECB Governing Council that decides monetary policy (policy rates, unconventional policies) in the euro zone, the principle “one country, one vote” applied. In other words, each country had, through the Governor of its central bank, a systematic right to vote. To the votes of the 18 Governors were added the votes of the six members of the ECB Executive Board, for a total of 24 votes.

From now on, with the entry of a 19th member into the euro zone, the countries are classified into two groups, in accordance with the Treaty [\[1\]](#). The first group consists of the 5 “largest” countries, as defined by the size of GDP and the financial sector, with respective weights in the criterion of 5/6 and 1/6. The second group consists of the other countries, currently numbering 14 [\[2\]](#). Each month the group of five “big” countries has 4 votes and the Group of 14 “small” countries 11 votes (Table 1). The voting within the two groups is organized according to a principle of rotation defined by a [precise schedule](#): the Governor of each “big” country will not vote one time out of every five, while the Governor of each “small” country will not vote 3 times out of 14. However, the 6 members of the ECB Executive Board will continue to benefit from a systematic monthly right to vote. So every month, the conduct of the euro zone’s monetary policy will be decided by 21 votes, while under the old principle, that of “one country, one vote”, 25 votes were cast.

All the Governors will continue to take part in the Council’s two monthly meetings, whether or not they take part in the voting.

Table 1. Rotation group and participation in the ECB's capital

	GPD* (bn euros)	Bank assets (BA)	Criteria for membership in a vote rotation group (GDP 5/6; AB 1/6)	Rotation group	Share in %	Million euros
Euro zone (19 countries)						
Germany	2 718	7 682	3 545	Group 1 (5 countries/4 votes) The governor of each country votes 80% of the time	18.0	1 948.2
France	2 044	8 229	3 074		14.2	1 534.9
Italy	1 560	4 127	1 988		12.3	1 332.6
Spain	1 023	3 287	1 400		8.8	957.0
Netherlands	602	2 339	892		4.0	433.4
Belgium	380	1 071	496	Group 2 (14 countries/11 votes) The governor of each country votes 78.6% of the time	2.1	228.2
Austria	311	922	413		2.0	212.5
Ireland	164	1 049	312		1.2	125.6
Finland	193	523	248		1.3	136.0
Portugal	164	517	223		1.7	188.7
Greece	182	421	221		2.0	220.1
Luxembourg	45	944	195		0.2	21.9
Slovakia	72	60	70		0.8	83.6
Slovenia	35	49	38		0.3	37.4
Lithuania	34	25	33		0.4	44.7
Cyprus	17	91	29		0.2	16.4
Latvia	23	28	24		0.3	30.5
Estonia	18	19	18		0.2	20.9
Malta	7	55	15		0.1	7.0
	GPD* (bn euros)	Bank assets (BA)	Criteria for membership in a vote rotation group (GDP 5/6; AB 1/6)	Rotation group	Share in %	Million euros
Other EU members						
Potential members of the euro zone:						
Poland	388	361	384	Timetable abandoned	5.1	20.8
Republic Czech	150	192	157	Timetable abandoned	1.6	6.5
Romania	139	89	131	2019	2.6	10.6
Hungary	99	116	102	Timetable abandoned	1.4	5.6
Croatia	43	59	46	Timetable abandoned	0.6	2.5
Bulgaria	40	49	41	Timetable abandoned	0.9	3.5
Countries with opt-out clause:**					0.0	
United Kingdom	1 916	9 146	3 121	Never	13.7	55.5
Sweden	420	1 238	556	Never	2.3	9.2
Danmark	248	1 065	384	Never	1.5	6.0
European Union (28 countries)	13 036	43 753			100	10 825.0

* At end September 2013.

** Explicit (United Kingdom and Denmark) or implicit (Sweden).

*** As announced by the national authorities.

**** The contribution to ECB capital is based on the country's GDP and population (1/2; 1/2). The key can be different from the amount actually paid into the ECB capital. The net profits and losses of the ECB are not allocated to countries that are not members of the euro zone.

Source: Eurostat and ECB; author's calculations.

Why change the system of voting rights? The objective is clear and justified: it is to [maintain the decision-making capacity of the Governing Council](#) as the number of countries joining the euro zone increases.

The new system of voting rights [clearly benefits the members of the ECB Executive Board](#), which now have 28.6% of the voting

rights (6/21), while the old system would have given them “only” 24% (6/25). The group of “big” countries has 19% (against 20% in the old system). The group of “small” countries gets 52% (11/21) of the voting rights, whereas it would have had 56% (14/25) if the old voting system had been maintained. The group of “small” countries loses relatively more voting rights than the group of “large” countries, to the advantage of the ECB Executive Board.

2) The arguments of German and Irish opponents of the system of rotation

The arguments of German opponents of the new system, beyond just a loss of prestige, are that the largest economy in the euro zone and also the largest contributor to the ECB’s capital (Table 1) must necessarily take part in the votes deciding the zone’s monetary policy. To ensure that Germany’s interests are not neglected, when Germany doesn’t vote its Governor should have a veto. This veto would also be justified by the principle that you should be responsible only for your own decisions.

In Ireland, according to the opponents of the new system, the myth of equality between the countries of the euro zone is finished: the introduction of a rotation system that favours the big countries is formalizing the lack of equality between the zone’s countries. Ireland has thus been explicitly relegated to being a second tier country. Furthermore, Ireland’s influence in the decision-making process will be reduced even further as the euro zone continues to expand.

The introduction of the rotation system doesn’t seem to have aroused as much resentment from politicians or civil society in other countries in the euro zone.

3) Do the German and Irish arguments make sense?

As is well known, Germany has a culture of stability all its own, in particular due to its history a strong aversion to

inflation. In contrast, the countries of southern European are reputed to have a much less marked aversion to the “inflation tax”. It is this difference in the degree of “acceptable” inflation that has led to modelling the statutes of the ECB more or less on those of the Bundesbank, which was considered the only way of securing Germany’s participation in the euro zone. Today, however, the issue of inflation is no longer posed since the euro zone is entering into deflation, a situation that some think could last for years[3].

Today, it is much more the *methods* the ECB is using to conduct monetary policy that are being questioned in Germany by some of the country’s politicians, economists and citizens. The arguments being made by opponents of the rotation system, based on contributions to the ECB’s capital and more generally being Europe’s leading economic power, echo the policies that have been pursued in recent years by the ECB (e.g. easing eligibility criteria for securities deposited as collateral at the ECB, purchase of securitized assets) but also the future policy of purchasing sovereign bonds. These policies have raised fears in Germany that the ECB balance sheet will contain too much “toxic” debt that sooner or later could be dropped, with the cost of this being borne by the Bank’s principal funder.

Is it really believable that Germany’s interests wouldn’t be taken into account?

There are three arguments for answering “no”. First, even when the German Governor doesn’t vote, Germany will still have a “representative” on the Executive Board (currently Sabine Lautenschläger)[4]. In theory, of course, the members must consider the interests of the euro zone when they vote and not just the interests of their own country, but the reality is more complex[5]. Furthermore, the Governors, even when they do not vote, still have a right to speak, and therefore some power of persuasion. Finally, more generally, the desire for a consensus will make it necessary to take into consideration

the opinion of the Governors who are not voting.

How justifiable are the arguments of the Irish opponents of the rotation system? It is clear that the counter-arguments developed above (concerning the right to speak and the need for a consensus) that apply to the Germans also apply to the Irish.

However, it is true that Ireland, like all the countries in Group 2, will see its voting rights [further diluted as the euro zone expands](#). When the euro zone is comprised of 20 members, the 15 Group 2 countries will have to share 11 votes (Table 2, [source: p. 91](#)). When the euro zone expands again to 21 members, 16 Group 2 countries will still have to share 11 votes ... At 22 members, the creation of a [third group](#) will result in further dilution of the voting rights of groups 2 and 3, but not of group 1, the group of “large” countries, which will still continue to vote 80% of the time.

The question that is posed for Ireland but also for all the countries currently in Group 2 concerns the future expansion of the euro zone. To date, all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) that have not yet adopted the euro have abandoned a timetable for joining the euro zone (Table 1). The only exception is Romania, which has proposed 2019 for joining[\[6\]](#). Though the prospects of the other countries have not been abandoned, they nevertheless appear very distant[\[7\]](#). The likelihood that the euro zone will soon include 21 members is rather low, and the probability of exceeding 22 members even lower. Anyway, whatever the configuration, Ireland will never be part of group 3. It is thus the countries that are lagging in today’s group 2 (Malta, Estonia, Latvia, etc.) that have the most to lose in terms of the frequency of voting.

Table 2. Rotation system (first and second steps)

Total no. of governors	Group 1			Group 2			Group 3		
	Governors	Votes	Frequency of vote	Governors	Votes	Frequency of vote	Governors	Votes	Frequency of vote
First step: euro zone from 19 to 21 countries									
19	5	4	80%	14	11	79%			
20	5	4	80%	15	11	73%			
21	5	4	80%	16	11	69%			
Second step: euro zone from 22 to 27 countries									
22	5	4	80%	11	8	73%	6	3	50%
23	5	4	80%	12	8	67%	6	3	50%
24	5	4	80%	12	8	67%	7	3	43%
25	5	4	80%	13	8	62%	7	3	43%
26	5	4	80%	13	8	62%	8	3	38%
27	5	4	80%	14	8	57%	8	3	38%

Source: ECB (2009).

Conclusion

There can be no talk of a unified Europe while explaining that there are several categories of countries. How can there be congratulations for the euro zone gaining new members while at the same time explaining that only certain members can or should participate in its decision-making. In a unified Europe it is not acceptable for there to be a vote in the Council that is systematic only for certain Governors (but not all) or a right of veto that only a few Governors can exercise. Each country loses its monetary sovereignty by joining the euro zone: why should some countries lose more than others? But is it really desirable to go back to the old system of “one country, one vote”? No. The new voting system in the Governing Council is a good compromise between the need to maintain the Council’s decision-making capacity (and therefore have a reduced number of voters) and the need to allow each Governor to vote on a regular basis. From this point of view, the rotation system used in the euro zone is more balanced than that used in the United States, where some members may not vote for one, two or even three years[8]. In the euro zone, the length of time that a Governor does not vote on monetary policy will not exceed one month for Group 1 countries, and for countries currently in Group 2, it shall not exceed three months (so long as the euro zone consists of just 19

countries).

At least in theory. Because, in practice, while the Governing Council will continue to meet twice a month, the vote on the conduct of monetary policy will now take place only every six weeks ... (previously every four). The voting abstention time will thus be (slightly) longer than what is stated in the official documents of the ECB and the euro zone's national central banks...

[1] More specifically, on 21 March 2003 the European Council amended Article 10.2 of the statutes of the Eurosystem in order to allow the establishment of a system of rotation in the ECB Governing Council. The amended article provided that the rotation system could be introduced from the entry of the 16th member into the euro zone and at the latest upon the entry of the 19th member.

[2] The Treaty provides for the creation of a third group upon the entry of a 22nd country.

[3] For the first time since 2009, consumer prices fell, with prices falling -0.2% year on year.

[4] The other members of the Governing Council are from Italy (Mario Draghi, President of the ECB). Portugal (Vítor Constâncio, Vice-President of the ECB), France (Benoît Cœuré), Luxembourg (Yves Mersch) and Belgium (Peter Praet).

[5] The experience of the US Federal Open Market Committee shows that there is a regional bias in the way the Governors vote (Meade and Sheets, 2005: "Regional Influences on FOMC Voting Patterns", *Journal of Money Credit and Banking*, 33, pp.

661-678).

[6] It will in any case have to respect the Maastricht criteria (criteria on the public deficit, interest rates, inflation, etc.).

[7] This shift is due in part to the fact that many of the Central and East European countries have benefited from the depreciation of their currencies against the euro. They have thus understood that joining the euro zone would not just bring them benefits. In addition, it is assumed here that the United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden will never join the euro zone because of their opt-out clause.

Does housing contribute to wealth inequality?

par Guillaume Allègre and Xavier Timbeau

[In a response to *Capital in the twenty-first century*, Odran Bonnet, Pierre-Henri Bono, Guillaume Chapelle and Etienne Wasmer \(2014\)](#) attempt to show that the conclusion of the book in terms of the explosion of wealth inequality is not plausible. They point out what they see as an inconsistency in the thesis: according to the authors, the capital accumulation model used by Piketty is a model of accumulation of productive capital, which is inconsistent with the choice to use housing market prices to measure housing capital. To correctly measure housing capital, one should use rent and not housing prices.

By doing this, the authors conclude that capital/income ratios have remained stable in France, Britain, the United States and Canada, which contradicts the thesis of Piketty.

In [OFCE briefing note n°9 \(“Does housing wealth contribute to wealth inequality? A tale of two New Yorks”\)](#), we show that the authors minimize the contribution of housing to inequality. In particular, we do not believe that trends in housing prices have “second order redistributive effects”. As is often the case, the disagreement is in part due to a lack of consensus on what really matters when discussing inequality: wealth inequality or income inequality or consumption inequality? If we follow the authors, only the consumption from wealth income should matter. We emphasize a theoretical inconsistency in the authors’ main argument. In fact, they value housing capital as the sum of the present values of rents, under the assumption that what matters is the housing service, then they use a dynastic model in which what matters is the transmission of wealth and not the discounted value of the housing service.

In short, our conclusion is that with regard to inequality, wealth matters, housing wealth is in fact wealth, and should be measured in a manner consistent with the measure of other types of wealth. By doing so, one finds that housing wealth does contribute to the growth of wealth and consequently, Piketty’s thesis is not refuted.

For more on this, see: [Allègre, G. and X. Timbeau, 2015: “Does housing wealth contribute to wealth inequality? A tale of two New Yorks”, OFCE briefing note, n°9, January.](#)

On debate in economics

By [Guillaume Allègre](#), [@g_allegre](#)


To Bernard Maris, who nurtured debate on economics with his talent and his tolerance

You have reasons for not liking economists. This is what Marion Fourcade, Etienne Ollion and Yann Algan explain in an excellent study, [The Superiority of Economists](#), with the main conclusions summarized in a blog post: ["You don't like economists? You're not alone!"](#) Although the study mainly concerns the United States, it is also applicable to Europe. It presents an unflattering portrait of economists, and in particular elite economists: they have a strong sense of superiority, are isolated from other social sciences, and are comforted by their dominant position of economics imperialism. The study also shows that the discipline is very hierarchical (some economics departments are "prestigious" and others less so) and that internal controls are very strong (in particular because the vision of what constitutes quality research is much more homogeneous than in other disciplines). This has an impact on publications and on the hiring of economists: only those who have sought and/or been able to accommodate this "elitist" model will publish in the infamous top field journals, which will lead to them being recruited by the "prestigious" departments.

This would not be all that serious if the job of economists were not to make public policy recommendations. Furthermore, the "superiority" of economics is based largely on the fact that the discipline has developed tools to make quantitative evaluations of public policy. Economics is thus, in part, a science of government, while the other social sciences have adopted more critical postures towards established categories, structures and powers. The consequence of all this – the discipline's hierarchies, the internal controls and the lack

of appetite for critical positions – is that debate is now virtually banned in academic economics (another reason not to like economists?). The figure below shows that the number of articles written in response to another published article has dropped dramatically since the 1970s: while these then represented 20% of articles published in the five major academic journals, today they represent only 2%. Debate and criticism are virtually absent from the major journals, as are heterodox paradigms. These are relegated to the supposedly less prestigious journals, which does not lead to being hired into the top departments. However, there is also a strong sense in the discipline that debate and criticism must be engaged at the academic level, a level where criticisms are subject to peer review (with effects on selection, reputation, etc.). You have to be crazy and ask permission to publish a criticism, but no madmen are applying for permission, so no criticism is published. The Anglo-Saxons use the term Catch-22 [\[1\]](#) to describe this type of situation.

Figure: Debate In the five main economic journals, 1920-2013



Note: The series shows the percentage of articles in the five main economics journals containing the words "comment", "reply" and "rejoinder". The five journals (Anglo-American) are: *Economic Review*, *Econometrica*, *Journal of Economic Literature*, *Journal of Political Economy*, and *Quarterly Journal of Economics*.

Source: Joe Francis, "The Rise and Fall of Debate in Economics", <http://www.joefrancis.info/economics-debate/>

If there is no longer any debate in academic journals, is it taking place elsewhere? In France, Thomas Piketty's *Capital in the Twenty-First Century* seems to be the tree that is hiding

the forest. The book's success globally has pushed a number of people to take a position, but can we really speak of a debate in France and Europe? [2] In the face of Piketty's success, Michel Husson ("[Le capital au XXI^e siècle. Richesse des données, pauvreté de la théorie](#)" [[Capital in the 21st Century – Wealth of data, poverty of theory](#)]) and Robert Boyer ("[Le capital au XXI^e siècle. Note de lecture](#)" [[Capital in the 21st Century – Reading notes](#)"]) have made some interesting criticisms based on, respectively, a Marxist and a regulationist approach. However, despite the quality of these critiques, it is apparent that this is not the focus of today's debate: if the global or European tax on capital proposed by Piketty does not come into being, it will not be because Marxist and / or regulationist arguments have carried the day. It is rather arguments based on the tax incentives for growth and innovation that are more likely to convince the authorities. This line of argument is supported by Philippe Aghion, among others. With regard to the taxation of savings and wealth, and despite the similar partisanship of these two French economists (they both signed calls for Ségolène Royal in 2007 and then François Hollande in 2012), Aghion and Piketty and their co-authors do not agree on anything (which André Masson demonstrates in a forthcoming issue of the *Revue de l'OFCE*). Piketty proposes a highly progressive wealth tax and a new tax merging the CSG wealth tax and the income tax (IR), which would tax investment income, including capital gains, as well as labour income. Aghion proposes the exact opposite: he would rely more on VAT, avoid merging the IR and CSG taxes (a "bogus good idea"), and set up a "dual capital/labour system" with a "progressive tax on job income and a flat tax on income from productive capital". It's a good subject for debate, which will nevertheless not take place in the scientific journals, or elsewhere.

In fact, Piketty and Aghion are addressing the issue of the taxation of wealth from opposite angles: Aghion approaches it

in terms of growth, while Piketty approaches it in terms of inequality. Why their models differ is understandable: they are not trying to explain the same phenomenon. Piketty's concern is to explain changes in inequality, whereas Aghion is trying to explain changes in growth. Although they deal essentially with the same phenomena, the two approaches do not so much oppose each other as go off at right angles. Yet from the perspective of policy makers, a confrontation between the two is essential: otherwise how is it possible to choose between the different recommendations of Piketty and Aghion?

Part of this post was published on the blog of *Libération*, L'économe : <http://leconome.blogs.liberation.fr/leconome/2014/12/de-la-sup%C3%A9riorit%C3%A9-des-%C3%A9conomistes-dans-le-d%C3%A9bat-public.html>

[1] The expression is taken from a novel by Joseph Heller with the same name. The novel takes place in wartime, and to be exempt from combat missions you have to be declared crazy. To be declared crazy, you have to apply. But according to Article 22 of the regulations, the very act of applying proves that the applicant isn't crazy.

[2] In the United States, on the other hand, there was debate about the book. For example, Greg Mankiw ([pdf](#)), Auerbach and Hassett ([pdf](#)) and David Weil ([pdf](#)) all made recent critiques.

Is the ECB impotent?

[Christophe Blot](#), [Jérôme Creel](#), [Paul Hubert](#) and [Fabien Labondance](#)

In June 2014, the ECB announced a set of new measures (a detailed description of which is provided in a special study entitled, "[How can the fragmentation of the euro zone banking system be fought?](#)", Revue de l'OFCE, No. 136, in French) in order to halt the lowering of inflation and sustain growth. Mario Draghi then clarified the objectives of the ECB's monetary policy by indicating that the Bank wanted to expand its balance sheet by a trillion euros to return to a level close to that seen in the summer of 2012. Among the measures taken, much was expected from the new targeted long-term refinancing operation (TLTRO), which gives banks in the euro zone access to ECB refinancing with a maturity of 4 years in return for providing credit to the private sector (excluding mortgages). However, after the first two allocations (24 September 2014 and 11 December 2014), the picture has become rather complicated, with the amounts allocated well below expectations. This reflects the difficulty the ECB is having in fighting effectively against the risk of deflation.

Indeed, having allotted 82.6 billion euros in September (versus anticipations of between 130 and 150 billion), the ECB granted "only" 130 billion on December 11, *i.e.* once again a lower amount than had been anticipated. So we are a long way from the maximum amount of 400 billion euros that had been evoked by Mario Draghi in June 2014 for these two operations. Moreover, these first two allotments were clearly insufficient to boost the ECB's balance sheet significantly (Figure 1), and all the more so as banks are continuing to reimburse the three-year loans that they received in late 2011 and early 2012 in the very long-term refinancing operation (VLTRO) [\[1\]](#). What explains the banks' reluctance to make use of this operation, even though it allows them to refinance the loans

granted at a very low rate for a 4 year term?

The first is that the banks already have very broad and very advantageous access to ECB liquidity through the monetary policy operations already implemented by the ECB[2]. These operations actually offer a lower interest rate than does the TLTRO (0.05% against 0.15%). Similarly, a TLTRO is not more attractive than some long-term market financing, especially since many banks do not have financing constraints. TLTRO is thus of marginal interest, due to the maturity of the operation, and more restrictive because it is conditioned on the distribution of credit. For the first two operations conducted in September and December 2014, the allotment could not exceed 7% of outstanding loans to the non-financial private sector in the euro zone, excluding loans for housing, as of 30 April 2014. A new series of TLTRO will be conducted between March 2015 and June 2016, on a quarterly basis. This time the maximum amount that can be allocated to the banks will depend on the growth in outstanding loans to the non-financial private sector in the euro zone, excluding loans for housing, between 30 April 2014 and the date of the operation in question.

The second explanation is that the weakness of credit in the euro zone is not simply the result of supply factors but also demand factors. Sluggish activity and private agents' efforts to shed debt are holding back lending.

Third, beyond banks' ability to find refinancing, it is also possible that they are trying to reduce their exposure to risk. The problem is thus related to their assets. However, non-performing loans are still at a very high level, especially in Spain and Italy (Figure 2). In addition, although the Asset Quality Review (AQR) conducted by the ECB has revealed that insolvency risks are limited in the euro zone, the report also points out that some banks are highly leveraged and that they have mainly used the available liquidity to buy government bonds in order to meet their


capital requirements. They are then reducing their balance sheet risk by limiting loans to the private sector.

Finally, two uncertainties are also reducing the banks' participation in the TLTRO. The first concerns the stigma attached to the conditionality of the TLTRO and to the fact that banks that do not meet their commitments on the distribution of credit will be required to repay the financing obtained from the ECB after two years. So banks facing uncertainty about their ability to increase their lending may very well wish to avoid the prospect of having to repay the funds sooner. The second factor concerns uncertainties about the programs for purchasing ABS and covered bonds^[3]. The banks could also turn to these programs to get cash in exchange for the sale of assets that they would like to get rid of.

Has monetary policy become totally ineffective? The answer is certainly no, since by giving banks a guarantee that they can refinance their activity through various programs (TLTRO, ABS, covered bonds, etc.), the ECB is reducing the risk that credit will be rationed due to the deteriorated state of some banks' liabilities. Monetary policy is thus helping to free up the credit channel. But its effects are nevertheless limited, as is suggested by [Bech, Gambacorta and Kharroubi \(2012\)](#), who show that monetary policy is less effective in periods of recovery following a financial crisis. Can we get out of this impasse? This observation on the effectiveness of monetary policy shows that the ECB should not be viewed as the be-all and end-all. It is still essential to complement its support for activity through an expansionary fiscal policy across the euro zone. This point was also reiterated by the President of the ECB during this summer's [conference at Jackson Hole](#): "Demand side policies are not only justified by the significant cyclical component in unemployment. They are also relevant because, given prevailing uncertainty, they help insure against the risk that a weak economy is contributing to


hysteresis effects.”

Figure 1. ECB balance sheet (assets)



Source: ECB.

Figure 2. Bad debt



Source: National central banks.

[1] See the special study in the *Revue de l'OFCE* no. 136, "[Comment lutter contre la fragmentation du système bancaire de la zone euro?](#)" for an examination of the various monetary policy measures taken by the ECB since the onset of the financial crisis and an estimate of their impact on the real economy.

[2] This includes standard monetary policy operations as well as the VLTR0 operation through which the ECB provided liquidity for an exceptional term of 3 years in December 2011 and February 2012.

[3] This involves programs for the purchase of securities in the market and not cash distributed directly to the banks. The covered bonds and ABS are securities pledged on assets whose remuneration depends on that of the underlying asset, which is by necessity a mortgage in the case of covered bonds and which in the case of ABS may include other types of loans (credit cards, cash loans to businesses, etc.).

Austerity and purchasing power in France

By [Mathieu Plane](#)

Is France implementing an austerity policy? How can it be measured? Although this question is a subject of ongoing public debate, it hasn't really been settled. For many observers, the relative resilience of wage dynamics indicates that France has not carried out an austerity policy, unlike [certain neighbours in southern Europe, in particular Spain and](#)

Greece, where nominal labour costs have fallen. Others conclude that France cannot have practiced austerity since government spending has continued to rise since the onset of the crisis[1]. The 50 billion euros in savings over the period 2015-17 announced by the Government would therefore only be the beginning of the turn to austerity.

Furthermore, if we adhere to the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, the degree of restriction or expansion of a fiscal policy can be measured by the change in the primary structural balance, which is also called the fiscal impulse. This includes on one side the efforts made on primary public spending (*i.e.* excluding interest) relative to the change in potential GDP, and on the other side the change in the tax burden in GDP points. Thus, over the period 2011-13, France's primary structural balance improved by 2.5 percentage points of GDP according to the OECD, by 2.7 points according to the European Commission, and by 3.5 points according to the OFCE. While there are significant differences in the measurement of fiscal austerity during this period, the fact remains that, depending on the method of calculation, it amounted to between 55 and 75 billion euros over three years[2].

A different way of measuring the extent of fiscal austerity involves looking at the change in the components of household purchasing power. Purchasing power can in fact be used to identify the channels for transmitting austerity, whether this is through labour income or capital, benefits or the tax burden on households[3]. Changes in the components of income clearly show that there was a pre-crisis and a post-crisis in terms of the dynamics of purchasing power per household.

Over the period 2000-2007, purchasing power grew by more than 4000 euros per household ...

This corresponds to an average increase of about 500 euros per year per household [4] (Table) over the eight years preceding the subprime crisis, a growth rate of 1.1% per year. On the

resource side, real labour income per household (which includes the EBITDA of the self-employed), supported by the creation of more than 2 million full-time equivalent jobs over the period 2000 to 2007, increased on average by 0.9% per year. But it is above all real capital income per household (which includes the imputed rents of households occupying the accommodation that they own) that increased dramatically over this period, rising twice as fast (1.7% on average per year) as real labour income. As for social benefits in cash, these increased by 1% on average in real terms in this period, *i.e.* a rate equivalent to the rate for total resources. As for levies, tax and social contributions from 2000 to 2007 have helped to reduce purchasing power per household by 0.9 points per year, which corresponds to about 100 euros per year on average. Breaking down the increase in levies, 85% came from social contributions (employees and self-employed), mainly due to hikes in premiums related to pension reform. Taxes on income and wealth contributed to cutting purchasing power per household by only 14 euros per year, despite a sharp increase in capital income and property prices over the period 2000-2007. During this period, taxes on households deflated by consumer prices increased by less than 2%, whereas real household resources grew by almost 9% and real capital income by 14%. The reduction in income tax, which began under the Jospin government, and was continued by Jacques Chirac during his second term, explains in large part why taxes have had so little negative impact on purchasing power during this period.

Changes in the components of purchasing power per household (in 2013 euros)

		Labour income (incl. EBITDA of IU)*	Capital income (incl. imputed rent**)	Social benefits in cash	Other resources	Total resources	Tax on income and wealth	Social contributions (salaried and non-salaried)	Total contributions	Purchasing power per household
Cumulative change	2000-2007	2283	1376	1120	34	4814	-110	-668	-778	4036
	2008-2015 o/w:	-1059	-911	1502	-61	-529	-785	-318	-1102	-1631
	2008-10	-293	-613	1021	-1	114	36	-36	0	114
	2011-13	-680	-314	355	-60	-699	-789	-143	-932	-1631
	2014-15	-85	16	125	0	56	-31	-139	-170	-114
Average annual change	2000-2007	285	172	140	4	602	-14	-83	-97	504
	2008-2015 o/w:	-151	-130	215	-9	-76	-112	-45	-157	-233
	2008-10	-98	-204	340	0	38	12	-12	0	38
	2011-13	-227	-105	118	-20	-233	-263	-48	-311	-544
	2014-15	-43	8	63	0	28	-16	-69	-85	-57

* IU = Individual undertakings.

** The notion of an imputed or fictive rent covers the service that is rendered to the owner of an accommodation by that accommodation, that is, the rent that owners would have to pay if they were tenants.

Sources: Insee national accounts, author's calculations, France's 2015 Budget Act.

...but over the period 2008-2015, purchasing power per household fell by more than 1600 euros

The crisis marks a sharp turn with respect to past trends. Indeed, over the period 2008-2015, purchasing power per household fell, on average, by almost 1630 euros, or 230 euros per year.

Over the eight years since the start of the crisis, we can distinguish three sub-periods:

– The first, from 2008 to 2010, following the subprime crisis and the collapse of Lehman Brothers, is characterized by the relatively high resistance of purchasing power per household, which increased by nearly 40 euros per year on average, despite the loss of 250,000 jobs over this period and the sharp decline in capital income (200 euros on average per year per household). On the one hand, the sharp drop in oil prices from mid-2008 had the effect of supporting real income, including real wages, which increased 0.9% annually. On the other hand, the stimulus package and the shock absorbers of France's social security system played their countercyclical role by propping up average purchasing power through a sharp rise in social benefits in kind (340 euros on average per year household) and a slightly positive

contribution by taxes to purchasing power.

– The second period, from 2011 to 2013, is marked by intense fiscal consolidation; this is a period in which [the tax burden increased by about 70 billion euros in three years,](#) with a massive impact on purchasing power. Higher tax and social security charges wound up eroding purchasing power by 930 euros per household, more than 300 euros on average per year. Moreover, the very small increase in employment (+32,000) and stagnating real wages, combined with the impact of an increase in the number of households (0.9% annually), led to a reduction in real labour income per household of almost 230 euros per year. In addition, real capital income per household continued to make a negative contribution to purchasing power from 2011 to 2013 (-105 euros on average per year per household). Finally, although social benefits were slowing compared to the previous period, they were the only factor making a positive contribution to purchasing power (about 120 euros per year per household). In the end, purchasing power per household fell by 1,630 euros in three years.


– The third period, 2014 and 2015, will see yet another slight reduction in household purchasing power, amounting to about 110 euros in two years. The weak situation of employment and real wages will not offset the increase in the number of households. Thus, real labour income per household will decline slightly over the two years (-43 euros per year on average). Real capital income will, in turn, be roughly neutral in terms of its effect on purchasing power per household. Although they are not rising as much, [tax and social contributions will continue to weigh on purchasing power due to the ramp-up of certain tax measures approved in the past \(environmental taxes, higher pension contributions, local taxes, etc.\).](#) In total, the increase in the rate of levies on households in 2014-15 will reduce purchasing power per household by 170 euros. In addition, the expected savings

on public spending will hold back growth in social benefits per household, which will rise by only about 60 euros per year on average, a rate that is half as high as the pre-crisis period despite the worsening social situation.

While this analysis does not tell us about the distribution per quantile of the change in purchasing power per household, it nevertheless provides a macro view of the impact of austerity on purchasing power since 2011. Out of the 1750 euros per household lost in purchasing power from 2011 to 2015 (see Figure), 1100 euros is directly related to higher taxes and social contributions. In addition to the direct impact of austerity, there is the more indirect impact on the other components of purchasing power. In fact, by cutting activity through the mechanism of the fiscal multiplier, France's austerity policy has had a massive impact on the labour market, by either reducing employment or holding down real wages. While the magnitude is difficult to assess, the fact remains that real labour income per household fell by 770 euros in five years. Finally, while since the onset of the crisis social benefits have up to now acted as a major shock absorber for purchasing power, the extent of savings in public spending planned from 2015 (out of the 21 billion euros in savings in 2015, 9.6 billion will come from social security and 2.4 billion from spending on state interventions) will have a mechanical impact on the dynamics of purchasing power.

Thus, with purchasing power per household falling in 2015 to its level of thirteen years ago and having suffered a historic decline in 2011-13 in a period of unprecedented fiscal consolidation, it seems difficult to argue on the one hand that France has not practiced austerity so far and on the other hand that it is not facing any problem with short-term demand.

Purchasing power per household



Sources: Insee national accounts, author's calculations, France's 2015 Budget Act.

[1] Since 2011, the rate of growth of public spending in volume has been positive, but has halved compared to the decade 2000-10 (1.1% in volume over the period 2011-14, against 2.2% over the period 2000-10). Moreover, in the last four years, it has increased at a rate slightly below the rate of potential GDP (1.4%). From an economic point of view, this corresponds to an improvement in the structural balance due to an adjustment in public spending of 0.5 percentage point of GDP over the period 2011-14.

[2] These differences in the measurement of austerity come from differences in a number of evaluation factors, such as the level of potential GDP and its growth rate, which serve as the benchmark for calculating the structural fiscal adjustment.

[3] It is important to note that gross disposable income includes only income related to cash benefits (pensions,

unemployment benefits, family allowances, etc.) but not social transfers in kind (health care, education, etc.) or public collective expenditures that benefit households (police, justice, defence, etc.).

[4] Here we use the concept of average purchasing power per household and not purchasing power per consumption unit.

The official introduction of the euro in Lithuania: does it really make no difference?

[Sandrine Levasseur](#)

On 1 January 2015, Lithuania adopted the euro *officially*, becoming the 19th member of the euro zone. The adoption was in reality formal, as the euro was already (very) present in Lithuania. For example at the end of 2014, over 75% of loans to Lithuanian businesses and households were denominated in euros, as were 25% of bank deposits.

The use of the euro alongside Lithuania's national currency, as a currency for loans, a means of savings and for invoicing, is neither an anomaly nor simply an anecdote: this practice concerns or concerned a number of countries in the former communist bloc. "Euroization" [1] is the result of economic and political events that, at one time or another in these countries' histories, have led them to use the euro in addition to their own currency. So given this context, will the official introduction of the euro in Lithuania really not change anything? Not exactly. Lithuania will see some changes, admittedly minor, as will the decision-making bodies of the

ECB.

The euroization of loans and deposits: the case of Lithuania, neither anomaly, nor anecdote ...

If we exclude the principalities, islands and States (Andorra, San Marino, the Vatican, etc.) that have negotiated the adoption of the euro with the European authorities but without joining the European Union together with the countries that have adopted the euro unilaterally (Kosovo and Montenegro), there is in addition a whole set of countries that use the euro alongside their own currency. These countries are mostly from Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans or the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). For example, in 2009, before Estonia and Latvia officially joined the euro zone (in 2011 and 2013, respectively), lending by private agents in the three Baltic states was mainly denominated in the euro, reaching a level of almost 90% in Latvia (Figure 1). Countries such as Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia and Macedonia were not far behind, with over 50% of their loans denominated in euros. The figures for deposits in euros are somewhat less striking (Figure 2), but still raise questions as to the attraction that the euro exerted in some countries as a payment or reserve currency or for precautionary savings.

Figure 1. Share of loans to the private sector denominated in euros (emerging Europe, 2009)





Figure 2. Share of private sector deposits in euros (emerging Europe, 2009)




There are a number of reasons why these countries have used the euro in addition to their own currency:

- **The existence of fixed** (or relatively fixed) **exchange rates** against the euro, which protects borrowers against the risk that their euro-denominated debt will grow heavier (since the likelihood of a devaluation / depreciation of the national currency is considered to be low);
- **A lower interest rate on loans denominated in euros** than when the loans are denominated in the national currency;
- **A strong presence of multinational companies (particularly in the banking sector)** that have not only funds in euros but also the “technology” to lend / borrow in euros;
- For loans in euros, **the ex ante existence of bank deposits in euros**, which is itself linked to [multiple factors](#) (e.g. the credibility of the monetary authorities, a strong presence of multinationals, revenue from migration coming from countries in the euro zone) .

These factors have been present to a greater or lesser extent in the different countries. In Lithuania, the existence of a [Currency Board \[2\]](#) vis-à-vis the euro since 2002 has generally

contributed to the economy's "euroization". This system of fixed exchange rates has enjoyed great credibility, prompting the country's businesses and consumers to borrow in euros, particularly since these benefited from very low interest rates (Figure 3). The presence of multinational companies in a number of sectors strengthened the use of the euro as a benchmark currency for different functions (billing, deposits and savings). The importance to Lithuania of banks from the euro zone should nevertheless not be overestimated: [the three largest banks operating in Lithuania are from Sweden and Norway](#). The risk of loans in euros thus involves, beyond the risk associated with the value of the Lithuanian lita, a risk associated with the value of a third currency. ... This risk will obviously not disappear with Lithuania's formal adoption of the euro.

**Figure 3. Interest rates on loans to the private sector
(based on the denomination of the loan)**



What changed on 1 January 2015?

Four changes can be highlighted:

(1) The euro now circulates in Lithuania in the form of notes and coins, whereas previously it existed primarily in the form of bank money (bank deposits and euro-denominated loans); the euro is the legal tender and will be used for all

transactions; and the lita will disappear after dual circulation for a fortnight.

(2) Changes to the price labels for goods will result in additional inflation, due to more frequent rounding off upwards rather than downwards. However, this phenomenon, which has been seen in all countries during the transition (official) to the euro, should have only a [minor impact](#). Experience shows that in general [perceived inflation is higher than actual inflation](#).

(3) Lithuania is adhering *de facto* to the [banking union](#), which can provide benefits in the financial sector (e.g. opportunities for additional collaboration in a common monetary and banking space, existence of an orderly resolution mechanism in case a bank runs into difficulty).

(4) The Governor of Lithuania's Central Bank is now a member of the ECB Governing Council and therefore participates in decision-making on euro zone monetary policy, whereas previously, under its Currency Board system[\[3\]](#), Lithuania's Central Bank had no choice but to "follow" the decisions taken by the ECB in order to maintain parity with the euro. It could be argued that in any case Lithuania will not carry much weight in the ECB's choice of monetary policy due to the size of its economy. Note, however, that Lithuania's entry into the euro zone is bringing changes to the way decisions are made by the ECB Governing Council. The principle of "one country, one vote" that prevailed until now is being abandoned [in accordance with the Treaties](#), due to the entry of a 19th member into the euro zone. Henceforth, the five "major" countries in the euro zone (defined by the weight of their GDP and their financial system) have now four voting rights, while the other fourteen countries have eleven votes. The vote in each group is established according to a [rotation principle](#), which displeases the [Germans](#), but [not just them](#). In practice, however, it is not certain that [this change in the voting system will affect many decisions](#). For example, while the

governor of Germany's central bank now has only [80% of its voting right](#), it still has 100% of its right to speak... Will not voting one month out of five really mean that it loses its power of persuasion?

On 1 January 2015, the official adoption of the euro by Lithuania was thus not at all amount to a Big Bang. However, it is very symbolic for Lithuania, further demonstrating how much it is anchored in both Europe and the euro zone. This shows once again that despite all the turmoil the zone has experienced, it still has its supporters. The most striking result of Lithuania's accession to the euro zone is probably the change in the ECB's system of voting rights: here too the symbolic meaning is heavy, as it sounds the death knell of the principle, "one country, one vote".

For more on the issue of euroization, readers can see:

Sandrine Levasseur (2004), Why not euroization ? *Revue de l'OFCE*, [Special Issue "The New European Union Enlargement"](#), April 2004.

For more on the system of rotating voting rights in the ECB, see:

Silvia Merler (2014), Lithuania changes the ECB's voting system, [Blog of Bruegel](#), 25 July 2014.

[\[1\]](#) Strictly speaking, euroization refers to the adoption of the euro as legal tender by a country without its being given permission by the issuing institution (i.e. the European Central Bank) or the decision-making authorities (i.e. the heads of State of the European Union member countries). Euroization is then said to be [unilateral](#). It differs from the

phenomenon discussed here, where the euro is used in conjunction with the national currency, but only the national currency constitutes [legal tender](#).

[\[2\]](#) A currency board involves a system of fixed exchange rates in which the central bank simply converts foreign exchange inflows and outflows into the local currency at the pre-defined parity. A central bank that adopts this system gives up the tool of autonomous monetary policy: its role is reduced to that of a “cashier”.

[\[3\]](#) See footnote 2.