

Youth “jobs of the future”: What impact on employment and government finances?

[Éric Heyer](#) and [Mathieu Plane](#)

The bill aimed at creating 150,000 “jobs for the future” [*emplois d’avenir*] for unemployed youth will be submitted to Parliament in October 2012. These 150,000 “jobs for the future” are to be reserved primarily for young people from deprived areas. What will be the net impact on employment and public finances?

These full-time jobs, which are planned to last a maximum of five years and are paid at least the minimum wage (SMIC), will be 75% funded by the State, with the rest of the cost being borne by local authorities, associations, foundations and business. According to the Minister of Labour and Employment, Michel Sapin, the goal is to create 100,000 jobs starting in 2013.

The ex-ante cost of the measure

The gross annual cost of a “jobs for the future” contract paid at the SMIC on the basis of a 35-hour full-time week is 24,807 euros. The cost per job for the public finances is 12,831 euros for 75% of the gross wage and 4,807 euros for the exemption from employer social contributions. To this should be added the remaining cost for the employer, or 7,276 euros, when the employer is not a public entity. Based on the assumption that two-thirds of the “jobs for the future” created would be in the non-market sector and one-third in the market sector, the total average annual cost for the public finances therefore comes to 23,015 euros per contract. When fully implemented, the cost of creating 150,000 “jobs for the future” is estimated at 3.45 billion euros a year.

The impact of the measure

By assuming the creation of 100,000 subsidized jobs in the non-market sector and 50,000 in the market sector, the impact would be as follows:

With relatively weak deadweight and substitution effects in the non-market sector (20% according to Fontaine and Malherbet, 2012), 100,000 “jobs for the future” would lead to the net creation of 80,000 jobs over the presidential term. The *ex-ante* annual cost to the public finances for 100,000 “jobs for the future” in the non-market sector would be 0.12 GDP point, but *ex post* this would be only 0.07 GDP point because of the extra income – and thus tax and social security revenue – generated by the jobs created.

The state aid (75% of the gross salary) allows a reduction in the cost of labour of 52% at the SMIC level, *i.e.* a total reduction of 71% of the actual cost of a minimum wage job if one includes the reductions in charges. With the impact of employment elasticities at a maximum labour cost at the level of the SMIC (1.2 according to a DGTPE study in 2007), the 50,000 “jobs of the future” in the market sector would generate 27,300 jobs. The *ex-ante* cost to the public finances would be 0.05 GDP point, and 0.03 GDP point *ex post*.

Ultimately, the measure would eventually create 107,300 jobs (about 25% of these in the market sector), *i.e.* an annual net creation of 72%. The *ex-ante* cost for the public finances would be 0.17 GDP point, but the *ex-post* impact of the measure on the public balance would be only -0.1 GDP point because of the extra tax and social security revenue generated by the jobs created and the consequent income gains (Table 1).

Table 1. Impact at 5 years of the measure on employment and the public finances

Création of...	Jobs (1 000)	Net creation (%)	<i>Ex ante</i> public balance (in GDP points)	<i>Ex post</i> public balance (in GDP points)
... 100,000 in the non-market sector	80 000	80 %	0.12	0.07
50,000 in the non-market sector	27 300	55 %	0.05	0.03
Total (150,000 jobs for the future)	107 300	72 %	0.17	0.10

Source : OFCE calculations.

According to statements by the Minister of Labour and Employment, two-thirds of the “jobs for the future” will be set up in 2013. To assess the impact of this measure over the presidential term, we started from the assumption that 25,000 full-time “jobs for the future” with a term of 5 years would be created each quarter from the beginning of 2013 until mid-2014.

Based on this profile for the implementation of the “jobs for the future”, the net new job creation expected in 2013 would be 71,600, with 35,700 in 2014, and then 0 from 2015 to 2017. The *ex-post* impact on the public balance would be 0.04 GDP point in 2013 and 0.06 point in 2014, *i.e.* a cumulative impact on the public finances of 0.1 GDP point over time.

Table 2. Impact of the measure on employment and the public finances from 2013 to 2017

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Jobs for the future (1000s)	100 000	50 000	0	0	0
Net job creation (1000s)	71 600	35 700	0	0	0
<i>Ex-ante</i> annual cost (billion euros)	1.44	3.31	3.45	3.45	3.45
<i>Ex ante</i> impact on public balance (GDP pts)	0.07	0.09	0.01	0.00	0.00
<i>Ex post</i> impact on public balance (GDP pts)	0.04	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.00

Source : OFCE calculations.

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Rent control: What is the expected impact?

Sabine Le Bayon, Pierre Madec and Christine Rifflart

[The decree on rent control](#), which was published in the *Journal officiel* on 21 July, takes effect on 1 August 2012 for one year. The measure was announced in January 2012 during François Hollande's presidential campaign. It has now been adopted, while awaiting the major reform of landlord-tenant rental relations that is scheduled for 2013.

Difficulties in finding housing and deteriorating living conditions for an increasing share of the population point to growing inequality in housing. This inequality is undermining social cohesion, which is already being hit by the economic crisis. For many people, homeownership is becoming a problematic proposition due to the rising cost of buying, while applications for the allocation of social housing remain on hold for lack of space, and the private rental market is becoming increasingly expensive in large cities because of the soaring price of property. Rent control in these cities is serving as an emergency measure to slow the price increases. This poses a challenge of keeping investors in the private rental market, which is already characterized by a shortage in housing supply and very low rental returns (1.3% in Paris after capital depreciation).

The decree aims to significantly lower market rents [2], which are being driven up by rents at the time of re-letting, *i.e.* during a change of tenant. Unlike rent during the lease period or upon renewal of a lease, which are indexed to the IRL rental benchmark, until 31 July 2012 rents for new tenants were set freely. In 2010, this applied to nearly 50% of re-lettings in the Paris area (60% in Paris). Now, in the absence of major renovations, these will be subject to control. Only rents for new housing that is being let for the first time or renovated properties (where the renovation represents more than one year's rent) will remain uncontrolled (Table 1).

Table 1. The method of setting rent under current law

Legal framework set by	Renewal of lease	Re-letting	First letting and new housing
Act of 6 July 1989 as modified	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Indexed to the IRL - In case of obvious under valuation, re-evaluation over 3 years or 6 years if the difference is greater than 10% - In case of renovations, increase agreed in advance between the landlord and tenant 	Uncontrôle	Uncontrôle
Decree for the Paris region	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Indexed to the IRL - In case of obvious under- or renovation for an amount at least greater than 1 year's rent, authorized increase of half the difference between the last rent and the market rent or of 15% of the actual cost of the renovation (tax incl.) 	Uncontrôle	Uncontrôle
Decree of 21 July 2012 (applicable in the relevant municipalities)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Indexed to the IRL - In case of obvious under-valuation or of renovation for an amount at least greater than 1 year's rent in the private or common areas, authorized increase of either half of the difference between the last rent and the market rent or of 15% of the actual cost of the renovation (tax incl.) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Indexed to the IRL - In case of an obvious under-valuation or of renovation for an amount between 6 month's rent and 1 years' rent in the private or common areas, authorized increase either of half of the difference between the last rent and the market rent or of 15% of the actual cost of the renovation (tax incl.) - Uncontrolled if renovation of at least 1 year's rent 	Uncontrôle

By using the [data from the Observatoire des Loyers de l'Agglomération Parisienne](#), along with the hypotheses set out in the [OFCE Note \(no. 23 of 26 July 2012\)](#), "Rent control: what is the expected impact?", we evaluated the impact this decree would have had if it had been implemented on 1 January 2007 and made permanent until 2010. According to our calculations, this decree would have resulted not only in sharply slowing increases in rents for re-lettings during the first year it

was applied (+1.3% in the Paris area, against 6.4% observed), but also in stabilizing or even reducing rents at the time of the next re-letting, *i.e.* in our example, three years later (in 2010, 0% in Paris and -0.6% in the Paris region). Finally, in 2010, rents would have been 12.4% lower in Paris and 10.7% lower in the Paris region than they would have been in the absence of the measure. This means that in Paris, rents would have been about €20.1 per sq.m instead of the rate of €22.6 per sq.m actually observed (Table 2). For an average size dwelling (46 sq.m) re-let in Paris, the monthly rent would thus have been €924 instead of €1,039, a savings for the tenant of €115 per month. For the Paris region as a whole, using the same assumptions, the rent upon re-letting would have fallen on average to €15.9 per sq.m, instead of the actual €17.8 per sq.m. For an average rental area upon re-letting of 50 sq.m, the gain would be €95 per month!

Over the longer term, the decree would make it possible to reduce the gap between sitting tenants in place for more than 10 years and new tenants (a gap of 30% in 2010 in the Paris region and 38% in Paris itself), and to improve market fluidity.

Currently, what possibility is there of moving if the mere fact that a couple has children increases the price per sq.m by over 15% in the Paris region? Similarly, the financial incentive to move for a couple living in a four-room 80 sq.m dwelling whose children have left home is zero, because the rent for a 60 sq.m unit with 3 rooms would cost just as much. This premium on being sedentary increases the pressure on the rental market and encourages households to stay in properties that are not suited to their needs, and even hampers labour market mobility.

Can this measure encourage mobility and restore household purchasing power? In the short term, it will certainly benefit the most mobile households by limiting the increase in the share of their budget spent on housing [3]. But these are the

households facing the least constraints on income, that is to say, those with high incomes or a relatively low share of income spent on housing. It will also benefit households that are forced to move or those who are running up against the limits on their finances. For all these households, the increase in the share of income on housing will be lower than it would have been without the decree. In contrast, for low-income households whose share is already high [4], the decree won't change anything, because they can ill afford the additional cost of re-letting.

Table 2. Simulated change in rents upon re-letting in the Paris region using the hypothesis that the decree took effect on 01 Jan 2007

	Rents noted letting on 31/12/2006	Rents after re-letting on 01/01/2007	Change in 2007	Rents on 31/12/2009 after indexing to IRL and before re-letting	Rents on 01/01/2010 after letting	Change in 2010	Gap between observed and simulated rents upon re-letting in 2010
PARIS		19 €/m ²	2.2 %	20.1 €/m ²	20.1 €/m ²	0 %	-12.4 %
Actual	18.6 €/m ²	(20.1 €/m ²)	(+ 8.3 %)	(20,9 €/m ²)	(22,6 €/m ²)	(+8,3 %)	
PARIS REGION		15.4	1.3%	16 €/m ²	15.9 €/m ²	-0.6 %	-10.7 %
Actual	15.2 €/m ²	(16.2 €/m ²)	(+ 6.4)	(16.9 €/m ²)	(17.8 €/m ²)	(+5.7 %)	

What are the risks?

While there are real benefits to be expected, these would still need to be made viable by the application of this decree, or at least by the next Act. Besides the difficulty of implementing the decree (absence both of reliable mechanisms to monitor rents in the areas concerned and of a legal framework to allow tenants to assert their new rights), the impact of this measure will be positive for tenants only if the rental supply does not shrink (by maintaining current investors in the market and continued new investment) and if landlords do not seek to offset future rent control by raising the rent at the time of the first let.

Likewise, the realization of improvements in line with the Grenelle 2 environmental consultation or simply maintenance

work could wind up being abandoned due to the lengthening of the amortization period for landlords compared with the previous situation. Conversely, some owners might be encouraged to carry out major renovations (in excess of one year's rent) and "to upgrade the dwelling" in order to be able to freely determine the rent. This would give the landlord a margin of safety to offset any subsequent shortfall. These increases, if they occurred, would penalize less creditworthy tenants and would promote the process of gentrification already at work in the areas under greatest pressure. We could then see increasing differences between the market for "rundown housing" and that for renovated housing.

This decree should in the short term limit the extent of disparities in the areas under greatest pressure, at no cost to the government. But it will not solve the problem for the poorest households of the share of income going to housing: to do this, it is necessary to increase the stock of social housing, to improve its fluidity and to significantly upgrade housing subsidies [5], which would require a major financial effort. The fundamental problem remains the lack of supply, particularly in urban areas, where by definition the available land is scarce and expensive, with higher rents simply passing on the price of property. However, to ease housing prices, more land needs to be available, with a greater density where possible, transport needs to be developed to facilitate the greater distance travelled between residential areas and workplaces, and so on. These are the levers that need to be used if we are to improve the housing conditions of less well-off households.

[1] The decree applies in municipalities where the rent increases seen over the period 2002-2010 were more than double the increase in the IRL benchmark (*i.e.* 3.2% per year) and the

market rent per sq.m exceeds the national average outside the Paris region (€11.1 /sq.m) by 5%. This includes nearly 1,400 communes in 38 cities (27 in metropolitan France and 11 in overseas departments).

[2] There are two types of rent: the average rent is the rent of all rental housing, whether vacant or occupied; and the market rent is the rent of all dwellings available on the rental market, *i.e.* new rental accommodation and re-lettings. This is very close to the rent for re-lettings, as residences for first-time lets represent only a small portion of the available supply.

[3] This share has increased for 15 years for households in the private rental sector, and particularly the less well-off.

[4] In 2010, more than half of private sector tenants spent an income share on housing (net of housing benefit) of over 26.9%, but above all, the share was 33.6% for the poorest 25% of households.

[5] According to the IGAS report "Evaluation of personal housing assistance", in 2010, 86.3% of rents in the private rental sector were greater than the maximum rent taken into account for calculating housing benefit. Any increase in rent is thus borne entirely by the tenant.